



Research Article

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The Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency on the Development of Tertiary Education in North East Nigeria: A Study of Four Selected Institutions (2015-2020)

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Abstract: The general direction of my position in this study is that, the on-going Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria's North- East region is negatively affecting the development of tertiary education in the region. The study identified the impact of the insurgency on students' enrollment and academic performances. The study also investigated the impact of the insurgency on academic staff occupational mobility and infrastructural development in four selected tertiary institutions in the North-East region. The University of Maiduguri, Federal Polytechnic Mubi, College of Agriculture Gujba and Mai Idris Aloomo Polytechnic Geidam were the four selected tertiary institutions studied in the research. The research used qualitative and quantitative methods of inquiry. Reduction in level of students' enrollment, rising record of poor academic performances, departure of academic staff and destruction of developed facilities and obstruction of infrastructural development were found out to be part of the impact of Boko Haram Insurgency on the development of tertiary education in North-East Nigeria. Improving security within and around tertiary institutions as well as providing lucrative risk allowance package for academic staff of tertiary institutions in the North-East region were part of the policy suggestions made by the study.

Keywords: Boko Haram, Impact, Insurgency, North-East, Region.

INTRODUCTION

Armed rebellion against the Nigerian government started in 2009 by the Jihadist rebel group popularly known as Boko Haram, marked the beginning of insurgency in Nigeria's north east region (Akimbi, 2015). At least, 250, 000 out of 2.3 million people internally displaced by the insurgency have fled into Cameroun, Chad and Nigeria from Nigeria (Buchanan, 2015). In 2014, over 6, 600 have been killed by Boko Haram. Mass abduction especially the kidnapped of 276 school girls from Chibok in April 2014 was also carried out by Boko Haram (Nicholas, 2015). In the same 2014, the insurgency dramatically escalated with 10, 849 deaths added to 1, 000 earlier reported death cases in 2013 (VN, 2016). In 2014, Cameroun, Chad and Niger came under attack as the insurgency spreads across Nigeria's boundary into these neighboring countries thus, making the conflict a regional battle. Considering the number of people killed and properties destroyed by the ongoing insurgency, Boko Haram has been rated the world's deadliest terrorist group (BBC, 2016). The replacement of Abubakar Shekau with Abu Musab-al-Barnawi happened after the battle for Konduga in which the Nigerian government forces forcefully pushed Boko Haram out of Konduga to recaptured the town back.

It was announced that Shekau had been killed as the government forces displayed the picture of an insurgent killed in the battle as the dead body of

Shekau. Shortly afterward, Shekau bounces back in his usual way and manner of sending messages to the Nigeria Government through the internet and announced that he was not killed in the battle for Konduga and that he still remains the leader of Boko Haram. It was later confirmed by the government forces that the insurgent killed was not actually Shekau. And that Shekau is still alive (Buchanan, 2015). Much more later again, it was rumored that Shekau has been killed in a battle with Joint Multinational Forces made up of soldiers from Cameroun, Chad, Niger and Nigeria at Amchide a border town between Nigeria and Cameroun. As usual, Shekau bounces back again announcing he was still alive and remains the leader of Boko Haram. He announced his readiness to carry out more attacks on Nigerian government forces and civic institutions. And, as he promised, civic institutions which became part of frequent attack are tertiary institutions in the North-East states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe.

Nigerian government's establishment of a state of emergency at the beginning of 2012, extended in the following year to cover the entire north-east Nigeria, led to an increase in both security force abuses and militant attacks (Baba & Sheriff, 2018). This in turn instead of arresting the insurgency culminated in its severity than the pre-state of emergency period. The confusion and controversial conditions created under the state of emergency rule have not yet been addressed. Killings

rose than before, brutality grew higher, civilians became helpless as some of the attacks on highways are done by people one cannot ascertain whether they are Insurgents of Nigerian government forces. The security scenario in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states became undefined as the demarcation between those fighting in defense of national interest and those killing in the name of God became relatively narrowed. Insurgents devised several strategies with which they countered government forces tactics to contain them. Anxiety rose ever than before, military transfer of aggression on innocent civilians grew with time and as such several citizens fled their homes in anticipation of possible aggressive military raiding. This also contribute in building up the number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's) by the insurgency (Nicholas, 2015).

Declaration of state of emergency rule in north eastern Nigeria by the federal government of Nigeria has failed in ending the insurgency the region is suffering from. Military alleged taking over of the Sambisa forest and its establishment of camp zero there in has also not ended attacks across the region. Insurgency at initial stage may be possibly contained but once extended, fire power hardly ends it. In some cases, insurgency live longer than expectation. It does not end easily overnight and military power has not successfully crushed it to end anywhere in the world. It ends itself for natural reasons like the death of its sponsors and strategists. And in other, it melted and subdue itself into bodies of factions with several leaders fighting a common cause. And at times, it broke into groups with different lords fighting against themselves for lack of unify aim of struggling thus, reducing their engagement of government forces.

Dialogue rather than military power has subdued it in some cases but with resurgence witnessed in the advent of violation of agreement reached by parties involved in the conflict. In north eastern Nigeria, insurgency is still on but with reduction in waves of attacks and rise in military successes in neutralizing attacks and dislodging insurgents, it is expected that the conflict which many believed had lasted longer will soon come to end though it is still far from ending soon as many believed. Waves of attacks on tertiary institutions in Nigeria's north east region which are common experiences in the activities of Boko Haram are still on and impacting negatively on the development of tertiary institutions in the region. Repeated attacks on the University of Maiduguri by Boko Haram have resulted in the stagnation of the development of academic excellence the institution was formerly identified with. Bombing of Federal Polytechnic students' hostel at Wuro-Fatoji in Mubi also culminated in serious drawback on the growth of tertiary education in the institutions. Boko Haram's slaughter of hundreds of students` in their sleep-in student dormitory at College of Agriculture in Gujba affected the overall activities and stability of the

college. And, persistent attacks leading to the bombardment and destruction of academic centers and facilities at Mai Idris Aloomo Polytechnic Geidam have also, negatively impacted on the development of tertiary education dissemination in the institution. The activities of the group which have refused to end, are unwelcome omen to the development of tertiary education in Nigeria's north east region.

Tertiary education is designed to enable individuals make use of their talent as well as the opportunities provided by the society for self-fulfillment. Achieving the developmental needs and meeting the socio-cultural demands of a country is one of the major aims of tertiary education. Tertiary education provides an opportunity for individuals to develop their potential. It fulfils the needs for high-level manpower in a society. Its objectives include cultural and material development to meet the learning needs and aspirations of individuals through the development of their intellectual abilities and aptitudes throughout their lives. The ultimate goal of tertiary education is to produce graduates who will be effective leaders in their chosen professions, valued members of their communities, and responsible citizens of the world (Iruonagbe *et al.*, 2015). Tertiary education institutions assure the relevance of their knowledge, identify skills gaps, create special programs and build the right skills that can help countries improve economic prosperity and social cohesion, adapt workforce development to the economy and changing demand for the new skills, develop relevant ideas necessary for promoting national cohesion and societal development. Thus, tertiary education in every country is guided by a philosophy which is concerned with specific problems arising from the existence of universities and tertiary education institutions (Saint *et al.*, 2003). From 1980's and beyond, the decay of all tiers of education was monumental. Facilities had almost collapsed; teachers and lecturers' morale were at its lowest. Enabling environment for conducive teaching and learning was absent. Insecurity promoted by Boko Haram insurgency joined the list of phenomena affecting the development of tertiary education in Nigeria especially in the North-East region. Enabling environment for conducive teaching and learning have seriously been affected negatively by the insurgency.

Problem Statement and Justification of the Study

Boko Haram insurgency is one of the prevailing conflicts in Nigeria. It started as an internal conflict but soon spread across Nigeria's international boundaries into Cameroun, Chad and Niger thus, becoming a regional conflict in nomenclature than an internal one. The conflict translated in destruction of socio-economic and political activities across the North-East Region of Nigeria with Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States been the most affected part of the region (Baba, 2016). Several studies came up with time as the insurgency continues. Some of the studies among others

have offered a number of policy suggestions on the impact of the conflict on the state and development of socio-economic and political activities in the region (Higazi, 2013). What is the impact of the conflict on the development of tertiary education in the region? Why has previous research suggestions failed in ameliorating the problem? And how can the problem be ameliorated?

Little attention was given to the impact of the conflict on the development of tertiary education in the above mentioned three most affected states in the region. This may be due to the fact that in-depth investigation has not been conducted on the condition and state of tertiary education in the states as the insurgency continues. And, this may also be responsible for the inability of initial research suggestions to ameliorate the falling standard of tertiary education caused by the conflict in the three mentioned states. Thorough knowledge of the state of tertiary education in the region during the pre-conflict as well as in the conflict eras is needed to be able to make an objective conclusion on the impact of the conflict on the development of tertiary education and how it can be corrected positively.

Previous studies have all adopted the qualitative method of inquiry into the impact of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria's north east region (Iweze, 2014). Though, none of the studies has been able to explore the impact of the insurgency on the development of tertiary education in the region. And, primary method was not adopted in initial related studies. Both qualitative and quantitative approaches are jointly needed to be able to acquire sufficient knowledge of the insurgency, its impact on the development of tertiary education and policy suggestions on how it can be ameliorated.

The fore goings justified the nature of gaps created in knowledge especially in the areas of methodology and exploring the impact of the prevailing insurgency on the development of tertiary education in the north east region. It is the desire to bridge up the identified research gaps stated that the proposed study shall be necessitated.

OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The objectives of the study are to:

- Investigate the impact of Boko Haram insurgency on students' enrollment in University of Maiduguri, Mai Idris Aloomo Polytechnic Geidam, Federal Polytechnic Mubi and College of Agriculture Gужba.
- Identify the impact of the insurgency on the academic performances of students of University of Maiduguri, Mai Idris Aloomo Polytechnic Geidam, Federal Polytechnic Mubi and College of Agriculture Gужba.
- Identify the impact of the insurgency on academic staff occupational stability and

mobility in University of Maiduguri, Mai Idris Aloomo Polytechnic Geidam, Federal Polytechnic Mubi and College of Agriculture Mubi.

- Investigate the impact of the insurgency on infrastructural development in the four selected tertiary institutions.

Research Question

The questions of the study include:

- What is the impact of Boko Haram insurgency on students' enrollment in University of Maiduguri, Mai Idris Aloomo Polytechnic Geidam, Federal Polytechnic Mubi and College of Agriculture Gужba.
- What is the impact of the insurgency on the academic performances of students of University of Maiduguri, Mai Idris Aloomo Polytechnic Geidam, Federal Polytechnic Mubi and College of Agriculture Gужba.
- What is impact of the insurgency on academic staff occupational stability and mobility in University of Maiduguri, Mai Idris Aloomo Polytechnic Geidam, Federal Polytechnic Mubi and College of Agriculture Mubi.
- What is the impact of the insurgency on infrastructural development in the four selected tertiary institutions.

Hypothesis

The hypotheses formulated to guide the study are;

H1: Boko Haram insurgency has impact on students' enrollment.

H2: Boko Haram insurgency has impact on the academic performances of students`.

H3; Boko Haram insurgency has impact on academic staff occupational stability and mobility.

H4: Boko Haram insurgency has impact on infrastructural development.

The formulated hypotheses were also tested using the percentage, frequency, mean and standard deviation statistical tools of analysis.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The insurgency in north eastern Nigeria took place within the context of long-standing religious violence between Nigeria's Muslim and Christian communities (Nossiter, 2015). Though, Boko Haram consistently claimed it is fighting to establish Islamic state and law in Nigeria. But then, the reasons why more Muslims are attacked and killed in the conflict than people from any other religion is enough reason to argue the basis that the group is fighting for the sake of Islam. Most of the communities attacked and persons displaced in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states which are the battle fronts had more Muslims than Christians. Suicide bombings that took place in most of the soft spots across Nigeria have claimed the lives of more Muslims than Christians (Windsor, 2015). Several Muslim Ulamas in Major towns especially in Borno and

Yobe states have been attacked while few others have been killed especially in Maiduguri the Borno state capital (More, 2015). In most of the camps if not all where Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's) are settled, there is hardly one without Muslims. This implies that the insurgency was affiliated with Islam by Boko Haram in order to deceive ignorant young ones who were ever willing to fight and die in the name of God into joining the group and build up more combatants needed to take up arms against the Nigerian state and authority (Baba, 2018).

Swathes territory in and around their home state of Borno estimated at 50, 000 square kilometers (20, 000sq mi) had been captured by Boko Haram in mid-2014 (Mark, 2015). Boko Haram did not capture Maiduguri the Borno state capital where the group was originally based but the group hold tight to the territory it captured and control up to January 2015 (Karimi & Abubakar, 2015). But the Nigerian Armed Forces shortly revealed that Nigerian Troops Have Destroyed All Boko Haram Camps (Baba & Sheriff, 2018). The contradicting observation in this revelation is the point that, if all Boko Haram camps have been destroyed, then conquered territories have been liberated. If conquered territories have been actually liberated then there is no need to continue accommodating Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's) in the various camps where hardships due to shortage of amenities is the order of the day. We may accept the fact that repairs especially reconstruction of facilities damaged need to be done before IDP's can be returned to their various communities (Lamb, 2016). But then, the problem is the basic question of how long or soon it is going to take the Nigerian government in doing this so that the IDP's most of whom are already hopeless of the possibility of starting a new life all over again can be given the hope of starting a life with prospect of achieving higher level and standard than before (Akimbi, 2015).

Large portion of land in northern and central Borno state including Damboa in southern part of the state came under Boko Haram's control in May 2013. During this period, Nigerian forces were already as part of military Joint Task Force (JTF) fighting counter-insurgency in Borno and Yobe states. This military operation includes the riot police popularly known as mobile police in the country and the department of state services carrying out intelligent service in the area. The vast land mass of the states made it difficult for JTF to patrol the whole region under insurgency therefore, military actions were more centered in larger towns including Maiduguri and around military barracks. Taking advantage of this difficulty, Boko Haram established bases and camps in areas with lighter military presence and later in the extensive savanna forest known as Sambisa extending across much areas of southern Borno and into parts of Yobe. Boko Haram was later dislodged from some of the areas in camps and bases were established to enable the group further

its attacks in Mid-May 2013 as a result of reinforcement to the government forces. Some of Boko Haram's camps were bombed from the air. And, instead of halting the escalation of the conflict, the insurgency even grew higher with several counter strategies emanating from waves of attacks perpetuated by Boko Haram (DHQ, 2015). Military actions as counter-insurgency measures are still ongoing in Nigeria's north east region. Although, some information on the situation faded especially during the period in which Nigerian government declared state of emergency in the region. This declaration halted mobile phone service provision making detailed information about the insurgency and humanitarian crises emanating from it invisible to people. Mobile phone networks went off in the three states (Adamawa, Borno and Yobe) under emergency rule and information reaching the people were mainly from press reports in Maiduguri the Borno state capital. Statistics of people caught up by the insurgency, those relocating from affected areas and those killed by the conflict became affected and unspecific due to absence of communication network.

The growing violence by the militants of Boko Haram and the desire the put an end to such escalation led the Nigerian government into declaring a state of emergency in the north eastern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe on 14th May 2013. This response to the growing violence promoted by Boko Haram due to its opposition to secular and westernizing influences culminated in critical psychological trauma in the three states affected by the emergency rule. The reformist Salafi/Wahhabi groups in northern Nigeria have been challenging the established Sufi orders, the Tijjaniya and Qadiriyya since the late 1970s. This established age long challenged resulted in the emergency of Boko Haram which has broken away from the reformist Salafi/Wahhabi groups. The ideology of Boko Haram chooses selectively on Salafi ideas – which are diverse but hold that Muslims should live according to the rules and modes of conduct established by the Prophet Muhammad and the first three generations of his followers, the 'pious predecessors (al-salaf al-salih). Salafis emphasize the 'restoration of Islamic doctrines to a pure form', but the founding ideas of the Salafiyya movement in the early twentieth century also had a strong modernist streak encouraging educational reform and the acquisition of scientific and technological knowledge (Baba & Sambo, 2016). The Boko Haram ideology, condemning secular education and any government or civil service work, deviates from Salafi doctrine. Boko Haram does use technology, including the internet and mobile phones, and members of the group have acquired technical expertise to make explosives, including car bombs. It seems that as long as the knowledge helps their religious/political struggle they are willing to utilize it.

It is clear that Boko Haram fighters have been dislodged from most of their strong holds in north east

Nigeria. Large unmanned areas they have established bases and camps in have also been taken over and their insurgents pushed away from those places by the government forces. Though, resurgence of pocket of attacks by the group bear features of the view that their remnants have relocated into more peripheral parts of Borno and across Nigeria's borders into neighboring countries of Cameroun, Chad and Niger. As a result of insurgents relocating from the forested bush including Sambisa forest reserve and surrounding areas into mountainous caves, villages in Gwoza Hills which is the north east extension of the Mandara mountains stretching from north east Nigeria into Cameroun have seriously been affected by the insurgency. Several villages in Gwoza Hills and towns have been attacked with many local residents in the communities slaughtered and properties wasted by Boko Haram fighters. These have forced several residents in Gwoza Hills and town to relocate to the vicinity of northern Adamawa state but some have moved further, such as to Jos and even as Abuja in seek of refuge (Mark, 2015). Meanwhile soldiers have been deployed into the Gwoza Hills and have been searching for guerrilla fighters in the caves. The military has carried out some aerial bombing and there has been a movement of refugees across the Mandara Mountains over the border from Nigeria into the far north of Cameroun.

The northern and central areas of Borno have also seen military activity, with refugees and Boko Haram fighters moving across the border into southern Niger, especially to Diffa. Hostilities are reducing with time and attention in the north eastern region is drifting towards the impact of the insurgency on the development of tertiary education which many affirmed has been negatively affected by the conflict. The dimension taken by the development of tertiary education in the region is not only sluggish but sympathetic. Decline in students' rate of enrollment and poor academic performances as well as instability in occupational stability and serious drift of academic staff from tertiary institutions in the region to more secure and safer regions as well as destruction of facilities and developed infrastructures by repeated attacks are retarding the developmental paste of tertiary education in Nigeria's north east region. These ugly experiences are matters demanding urgent attention from government in the country. Attention is highly needed especially on the possible modalities necessary to promote and encourage the development of effective tertiary education despite the ongoing insurgency in the region.

Tertiary educational Institutions in Nigeria include Universities, Polytechnics and Colleges of Education. There are currently 129 approved universities in Nigeria comprising 40 Federal Universities, 39 State Universities and 50 Private Universities (NUC, 2014). Also, Nigeria has a total of 128 approved polytechnics and 117 approved

Colleges of Education in Nigeria, making it the largest tertiary education system on the African Continent (Adesulu, 2013). Although, Public Universities have dominated the tertiary education landscape in Nigeria for several decades, their failure to cope with admission pressure became more compelling from the 1990s. Though, from 2015 to 2020, competition for admission into tertiary institutions in Nigeria's North-East region has reduced due to the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency. The first tertiary educational institution in Nigeria, the Yaba Higher College, was established in 1932.

Tertiary education is any of various types of education given in postsecondary institutions of learning and usually affording, at the end of a course of study, a named degree, diploma, or certificate of higher studies. The goal of higher education in Nigeria is designed towards advancing Nigeria's economic growth and global competitiveness through the provision of accessible, relevant, high quality education in our Tertiary Education Institutions and to constantly attract, develop and graduate competent, knowledgeable and talented individuals from our Tertiary Education Institutions (Adesina & Awonusi, 2004). The ultimate goal of higher education is to produce graduates who will be effective leaders in their chosen professions, valued members of their communities, and responsible citizens of the world. Tertiary education institutions assure the relevance of their knowledge, identify skills gaps, create special programs and build the right skills that can help countries improve economic prosperity and social cohesion, adapt workforce development to the economy and changing demand for the new skills, develop relevant knowledge required for moving the national economy toward prosperity (Adesina & Awonusi, 2004).

The agitation of Nigerians for a more comprehensive tertiary education provision led to the constitution of the Asquith and Elliot Commission on Higher Education. Their reports in 1943 favored the establishment of universities in Nigeria. Consequently, in 1948, the University College Ibadan was founded as an affiliate of the University of London. The University College continued as the only university institution in Nigeria until 1960 (Akinyemi, 2013). In April 1959, the Nigerian government commissioned an inquiry (Ashby Commission) to advise it on the tertiary education needs of the new nation for its first two decades of independence. Before the submission of the report on 2nd September 1960, the Eastern Region government established its own university at Nsukka, the University of Nigeria Nsukka, 1960 (Obadara & Alaka, 2013).

Historical development of tertiary education in Nigeria is a tale full of numerous sacrifices made by the country's founding fathers. Nigeria is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country. Before the 18th century, there

was little or no difference between Europe and Africa, but the slave trade coupled with the industrial revolution in Europe changed the socio-economic equation. Africa became the trading subordinate of Europe and later its colony. A review of the Nigerian educational system from 1842 to 1959 revealed that there was absolutely nothing in the Nigerian educational system that promoted “national consciousness”, “national unity”, “patriotism” or the like. In fact, the colonial government never pretended to build a Nigerian nation. The citizens were either British subjects or British protected persons whose loyalty was supposed to be for the British Empire and the King or Queen of England. The consequent effect of this was that instead of training the people in the area of technology, majority of the citizens were educated in the area of civics as they were meant to assist the British colonizers in some administrative duties (Aluede *et al.*, 2012).

The National Policy on Education is anchored on Nigeria's philosophy on education as enunciated through the nation's objectives. Nigeria has five main national objectives as provided by the Second National Development Plan and accepted as the necessary foundation for the National Policy on Education. Nigeria's philosophy of tertiary education is concerned with specific problems arising from the existence of universities and higher education institutions in the country. The aim of higher education is to meet the socio-cultural and developmental needs of a country (Dawodu, 2010). Tertiary education provides an opportunity for individuals to develop their potential. It fulfils the needs for high-level manpower in a society. Its objectives include cultural and material development. Tertiary education can lead to many benefits, such as prosperous career and financial security (Iruonagbe *et al.*, 2015). In the 21st century, education plays an even more significant role in other aspects of your life. Attaining a higher education can increase your opportunities and improve your overall quality of life (Abdulkareem *et al.*, 2011). Poverty Reduction, connecting across borders, sense of accomplishment, more productivity, better communication, and critical thinking skills, identification of skills and greater sense of discipline are some of the benefits of tertiary education (Iruonagbe *et al.*, 2015). These benefits also accompanied the acquisition of tertiary education knowledge in Nigeria like in other countries of the world.

METHODOLOGY

The study was conducted on four selected tertiary institutions in Nigeria's North East region. The University of Maiduguri, Mai Idris Aloomo Polytechnic Geidam, Federal Polytechnic Mubi and Yobe State College of Agriculture Gujba are the institutions studied in the research. The study on the institutions as designed, covered the period of five years (2015-2020). Qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection

were utilized in the study. Secondary data were sourced from the establishment department and student affairs unit of University of Maiduguri, Mai Idris Aloomo Polytechnic Geidam, Federal Polytechnic Mubi and Yobe State College of Agriculture Gujba which were the four tertiary institutions selected and surveyed in the study. Printed materials like newspapers, magazines, lecture notes, conference proceedings, seminars and workshop papers as well as internet-based data were utilized in the study. Primary data were obtained through the administration of structured questionnaire on three hundred respondents systematically chosen from the four institutions involved in the study. Each of the institutions was represented by seventy-five respondents among whom twenty-five were academic staff and fifty chosen among students. The questionnaire was administered separately in the institutions at different times and days but the structured items (questions) for the institutions were the same.

Correlation Analysis (CA) was adopted in analyzing data obtained through the administration of structured questionnaire on the respondents on the four basic expected objectives on the impact of Boko Haram insurgency on students' enrollment, students' performances, academic staff occupational mobility and infrastructural development where statistical correlation was measured by coefficient correlation with numerical values ranging from Ho to 1.0 giving indication of the strength of relationship. Such as:
 $r > 0$ indicated positive relationship
 $r < 0$ indicated negative relationship
 $r = +1.0$ described a perfect positive correlation
 $r = -1.0$ described a perfect negative correlation

The closer the coefficients to +1.0 and -1.0, the greater the strength of relationship as specified below:

<u>Value or r</u>	<u>Strength of relationship</u>
1.0 -----	Strong Relationship (SR)
0.5-----	Moderate Relationship (MR)
0.3-----	Weak Relationship (WR)
0.1-----	Very Weak Relationship (VWR)

Hence: 1.0=SR=Strong Relationship,
0.5=MR=Moderate Relationship, 0.3=WR=Weak Relationship and 0.1=VWR=Very Weak Relationship.
Note that Q simply refer to Q=Question.

The questionnaire of the study was administered by the Researcher personally in the four selected institutions without the use of research assistant. Selected institutions were visited at separate days by the Researcher beginning with the University of Maiduguri in Borno State, Federal Polytechnic Mubi in Adamawa State, College of Agriculture Gujba temporary operating at Damaturu in Yobe State due to its attack by Boko-Haram insurgents and lastly, Mai Idris Aloomo Polytechnic Geidam in Yobe State. Frequency, percentage, mean and standard deviation statistical tools of analysis were also adopted in testing the hypotheses formulated to guide the proposed study.

That is; H=Hypotheses, F=Frequency, P=Percentage, M=Mean and SD=Standard Deviation. Also, note that the letter Q frequently used in presentation and analysis of data in the study simply refer to Q=Question.

Furthermore, the followings used, means; SD=Strongly Disagreed, D=Disagreed, N=Neutral, A=Agreed and SA=Strongly Agreed. Figure “A” below depicted the positions of the institutions with star.




Figure “A”: Areas of Study marked with Stars

Source: <http://aoav.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Screen-Shot-2013-12-12-at-02.29.10.png>

Data Presentation and Analysis

Table 1: Correlation between Boko Haram Insurgency and the development of tertiary education in North-East Nigeria

Questions	SR (1.0)	MR (0.5)	WR (0.3)	VWR (0.1)
Q1. Boko Haram insurgency has led to the reduction in number of students` enrollment in tertiary institutions in Nigeria`s North-East region.	270	15	10	05
Q2. The insurgency has not affected students` performances academically in tertiary institutions in the region.	15	30	50	205
Q3. Several academic facilities and infrastructures have been destroyed by the insurgency in tertiary institutions in North-East Nigeria.	250	30	15	05
Q4. Some academic staff working in tertiary institutions in Nigeria`s North-East region have not left to other institutions in more safer regions outside the North-East.	16	22	32	230

Q-Question, SR (1.0)-Strong Relationship, MR (0.5)-Moderate Relationship, WR (0.3)-Weak Relationship and VWR (0.1)-Very Weak Relationship

Source: Author`s field Survey (2020)

Table 1 shows a strong relationship (SR) on the view that, Boko Haram insurgency has led to the reduction of in number of students` enrollment in tertiary institutions in Nigeria`s North-East region, a very weak relationship (VWR) on the position that, the

insurgency has not affected students` performances academically in tertiary institutions in the region, a strong relationship (SR) on the belief that, several academic facilities and infrastructures have been destroyed by the insurgency in tertiary institutions in

North-East Nigeria and a very weak relationship (VWR) on the assertion that, some academic staff working in tertiary institutions in Nigeria's North-East

region have not left to other institutions in more safer regions outside the North-East.




Figure 1. Correlation between Boko Haram Insurgency and the development of tertiary education in North-East Nigeria Q-Question, SR (1.0)-Strong Relationship, MR (0.5)-Moderate Relationship, WR (0.3)-Weak Relationship and VWR (0.1)-Very Weak Relationship
Source: Author's field survey (2020)

Table 2: The Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency on the Development of Tertiary Education in North East Nigeria

Questions	F/P							SD
	SD	D	N	A	SA	M	SD	
Q1. The level of students' enrollment in your school has increased from 2015-2020.	175 58.33%	65 21.67%	20 6.67%	25 8.33%	15 5%	60	3,620	
Q2. Boko Haram insurgency from 2015-2020 has impacted negatively on the level of students' enrollment in your school.	25 8.33%	45 15%	15 5%	80 26.67%	135 45%	60	1,900	
Q3. Academic activities have not been interrupted by Boko Haram insurgency in your school from 2015 to 2020.	185 61.67%	60 20%	25 8.33%	20 6.67%	10 3.33%	60	4,190	
Q4. Students' performances in continuous assessment and examinations have fallen low in your school because of the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency.	10 3.33%	25 8.33%	15 5%	80 26.67%	170 56.67%	60	3,650	
Q5. There is adequate security	195	60	15	20	10	60	4,870	

for academic staff in your school from 2015 to 2020 due to Boko Haram insurgency.	65%	20%	5%	6.67%	3.33%		
Q6. Several academic staff have left your school to institutions in other regions from 2015 to 2020 due to Boko Haram insurgency.	15 5%	20 6.67%	15 5%	55 18.34%	195 65%	60	4,780
Q7. Boko Haram insurgency has no negative impact on infrastructural development in your school from 2015 to 2020.	185 61.67%	70 23.33%	25 8.33%	15 5%	5 1.67%	60	4,400
Q8. Developed facilities like Administrative block, classroom, workshop, laboratory, hostel, ICT center, library, Entrepreneur and Skill acquisition center among other have been destroyed by Boko Haram insurgency in your institution from 2015 to 2020.	10 3.33%	15 5%	10 3.33%	75 25%	190 63.34%	60	4,830

Q-Question, F/P=Frequency/Percentage, SD-Strongly Disagreed, D-Disagreed, N-Neutral, A-Agreed, SA-Strongly Agreed, M-Mean and SD-Standard Deviation

Source: Author`s field survey (2020)

Table 2 shows that 58.33% of the respondents strongly disagreed with the view that, the level of students` enrollment in their school has increased from 2015-2020, 21.67% disagreed, 6.67% were neutral, 8.33% agreed and only 5% of them strongly agreed with the view. Also, on the position that, Boko Haram insurgency from 2015-2020 has impacted negatively on the level of students` enrollment in their school, 8.33% of them strongly disagreed with the position, 15% disagreed with it, only 5% remained neutral while 26.67% disagreed and 45% strongly agreed with it. The position that, Academic activities have not been interrupted by Boko Haram insurgency in their school was strongly disagreed with by 61.67% of the respondents, 20% of them disagreed, 8.33% remained neutral, 6.67% disagreed and 3.33% of them strongly agreed with the position. It is also clearly demonstrated by table 2 that, 3.33% of the respondents strongly disagreed that, students` performances in continuous assessment and examinations have fallen low in their school because of the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency, 8.33% disagreed, 5% were neutral, 26.67% agreed and 56.67% of them strongly agreed. Also, 65% of them strongly disagreed with the position that, there is adequate security for academic staff in their school from 2015 to 2020 due to Boko Haram insurgency, 20%

disagreed, 5% remained neutral while 6.67% agreed and only 3.33% of them strongly agreed with the position. It is further demonstrated by table 2 that, 5% of the respondents strongly disagreed that, several academic staff have left their school to institutions in other regions from 2015 to 2020 due to Boko Haram insurgency, 6.67% of them disagreed, another 5% preferred to be neutral as 18.34% agreed and 65% strongly agreed. On the assertion that, Boko Haram insurgency has no negative impact on infrastructural development in their school from 2015 to 2020, 61.67% of the respondents strongly disagreed, 23.33% disagreed, 8.33% were neutral, 5% agreed and only 1.67% of them strongly agreed with the assertion. Table 2 also demonstrated that, 3.33% of the respondents strongly disagreed that, developed facilities like administrative block, classroom, workshop, laboratory, hostel, ICT center, library, entrepreneur and skill acquisition center among other have been destroyed by Boko Haram insurgency in their institution from 2015 to 2020, 5% disagreed, another 3.33% of them remained neutral while 25% of them agreed and 63.34% of them strongly agreed. The average or mean score for all the Qs in table 2 is 60 while the mean or average SD score for all the Qs in table 2 is 6,448.




Figure 2. The Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency on the Development of Tertiary Education in North East Nigeria
 SQ-Question, SD-Strongly Disagreed, D-Disagreed, N-Neutral, A-Agreed, SA-Strongly Agreed
 Source: Author’s field survey (2020)

Table 3: Testing the Research Hypotheses

Hypotheses	F/P						M	SD
	SD	D	N	A	SA			
H1; Boko Haram insurgency has impact on students’ enrollment.	10 3.33%	15 5%	20 6.67%	75 25%	180 60%	60	4,150	
H2; Boko Haram insurgency has impact on the academic performances of students`.	20 6.67%	25 8.33%	15 5%	65 21.67%	175 58.33%	60	3,620	
H3; Boko Haram insurgency has impact on academic staff occupational stability and mobility.	15 5%	20 6.67%	10 3.33%	70 23.33%	185 61.67%	60	4,370	
H4; Boko Haram insurgency has impact on infrastructural development.	5 1.67%	15 5%	10 3.33%	80 26.67%	190 63.33%	60	4,970	

H-Hypothesis, F/P=Frequency/Percentage, SD-Strongly Disagreed, D-Disagreed, N-Neutral, A-Agreed, SA-Strongly Agreed, M-Mean, SD-Standard Deviation
 Source: Author’s field survey (2020)

Table 3 shows how the hypotheses formulated to guide the study were tested using the frequency, percentage, mean and standard deviation tool of analysis. Only 3.33% of the respondents strongly disagreed that, Boko Haram insurgency has impact on students’ enrollment, some 5% of them disagreed, 6.67% were undecided while 25% agreed and 60% strongly agreed. On the view that, Boko Haram insurgency has impact on the academic performances of students`. As displayed by table 3, some 20% of the respondents strongly disagreed with the view that, Boko Haram insurgency has impact on the academic performances of students`, 8.33% disagreed, 5% wished

to be neutral and 21.67% agreed while 58.33% strongly agreed with the view. Also, 5% of the respondents as table 3 presented strongly disagreed with the position that, Boko Haram insurgency has impact on academic staff occupational stability and mobility, 6.67% disagreed, 3.33% were neutral, 23.33% agreed and 61.67% strongly agreed with the position. Furthermore, table 3 demonstrated that, 1.67% of the respondents strongly disagreed that, Boko Haram insurgency has impact on infrastructural development, 5% of them disagreed, 3.33% preferred to be neutral and 26.67% agreed and 63.33% strongly agreed. H4 has the highest standard deviation (SD) score of 4,970 and H2 has the

lowest standard deviation (SD) score of 3,620, H3 has 4,370 as its standard deviation (SD) score and H1 has standard deviation (SD) score of 4,150. The average or

mean (M) for H1, H2, H3 and H4 stood at 60 while the average standard deviation (SD) score for H1, H2, H3 and H4 is 3,422.




Figure 3. Testing the Research Hypotheses
 H-Hypothesis, SD-Strongly Disagreed, D-Disagreed, N-Neutral, A-Agreed, SA-Strongly Agreed.
 Source: Author’s field survey (2020)

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

There is correlation between Boko Haram insurgency and the development of tertiary education in Nigeria’s North-East region. The dimension of correlation between the duo is a negative one. Boko Haram insurgency has resulted in the reduction of number of students’ enrollment in tertiary institutions in north east Nigeria. The period between 2015 and 2020 witnessed a serious declined in the level of students’ enrollment. The retrogressive and thus, negative correlation between Boko Haram insurgency and the development of tertiary education in the region also manifested in the area of students’ academic performances. Level of failure and poor or unsatisfactory performances in examination among students’ of tertiary institutions in the north east from 2015 to 2020 have fallen below expectation compared with the pre-insurgency period. The insurgency has destroyed several facilities, executed capital and on-going projects thus, making studies cumbersome especially in areas where practical is needed to make knowledge sound. Amounting negative correlation

incubated by threat to life and properties amid growing insecurity has also forced several academic staff working in tertiary institutions in north east Nigeria to leave to other institutions in more secured regions of the country. Some have even left for abroad completely.

The level of students’ enrollment has reduced seriously from 2015 to 2020 especially in Mai Idris Aloomo Polytechnic Geidam and College of Agriculture at Gujba. University of Maiduguri and the Federal Polytechnic at Mubi also witnessed severe reduction in level of students’ enrollment from 2015 to 2020. The impact of the insurgency on students’ enrollment which is negative was also witnessed by other tertiary institutions in Nigeria’s North-East region especially in the most conflict affected states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. Applicants from other regions of the country have been discouraged from applying for admissions in tertiary institutions in north east region due to the Boko Haram insurgency going on in the region. And, most of the available students’ in the institutions in the region are people who are indigenous to the locality where the schools are established. Parents

themselves fear sending their children to tertiary institutions in the north east region due to the insurgency going on in the region. Several students have lost their lives to the insurgency either on their way to the school or within the school premises or while trying to escaped Boko Haram attack on their school. The case of College of Agriculture Gujba in Yobe state where hundreds of students were slaughtered in their sleep at night inside their dormitories' is still fresh on the record of attacks carried out by the insurgents. Repeated bombings at different times in the University of Maiduguri have also left a number of students and even a Lecturer (Professor) death. The bombing at Wuro-Fatoji in Mubi Adamawa state of the Federal Polytechnic students' hostel also led to the death of a dozen of students'. These incidences added to reasons responsible for low enrollment and fear by applicants from other regions of the country to apply for admission in tertiary institutions in North-East Nigeria.

The impact of Boko Haram insurgency on the development of tertiary education in North-East Nigeria could be identify in the level of students' academic performances in tertiary institutions in the region. Though, poor academic performances of students can be attributed to unconducive atmosphere for learning which has made studies difficult to students'. In the University of Maiduguri, Federal Polytechnic Mubi, College of Agriculture Gujba and Mai Idris Aloomaa Polytechnic Giedam, Boko Haram insurgency which has made conducive atmosphere for studies difficult has resulted in high complain of poor performances in examination among students' from 2015 to 2020. Academic activities at different times have been interrupted by unexpected attack by Boko Haram insurgents. Academic calendar has been obstructed by unexpected attacks thus, resulting in delay in graduation duration and distortion of existing knowledge already acquired by students'. Psychological trauma built in students' feelings and minds has also led to poor or lack of concentration to studies for fear of possible attack by Boko Haram fighters- development that ends in poor performances in examination from the part of students'. Record of failure in examination is fast growing due to poor performances hatched by fear of Boko Haram insurgency. And, this to a larger extent is retarding the developmental paste of tertiary education in North-East Nigeria.

Academic staff occupational stability has also been negatively affected by Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria's North-East region. The impact of the insurgency on teaching staff occupational stability has translated in serious mobility of academic staff from tertiary institutions in Nigeria's North-East region. The working environment is not secured. Academic staff just like students' carry out their duty with fear of possible attack by Boko Haram insurgents. Inadequate security for academic staff to carry out their work has discouraged some of them from continue working in

institutions in the North-East region. Several academic staff have left tertiary institutions in the North-East region for those in more secured regions in the country from 2015 to 2020. Others have even left Nigeria and taken up lecturing job in tertiary institutions outside Nigeria. Few lesson seems to have been learned from such occupational mobility and exodus of academic staff from institutions in Nigeria's North-East region which has impacted negatively on the development of tertiary education in the level. The government has not created alternative means of discouraging academic staff available in tertiary institutions in the region from nurturing the intention of leaving for security reason. Risk allowance has not been provided for those available and their lives as well as those of their families have not been covered by insurance against possible attack by Boko Haram insurgency. Experienced academic staff who have left due to Boko Haram insurgency have been replaced with inexperienced and unqualified ones in some institutions in the North-East region. The departure of experienced academic staff and their replacement with inexperienced ones has translated in the falling standard of tertiary education in Nigeria's North-East region. University of Maiduguri which used to be among the first ten in national ranking of universities by the Nigerian University Commission (NUC) before Boko Haram insurgency started in the region, fell down to forty-five and later fifty between 2015 to 2020. Majority of the academic staff available in tertiary institutions in the region now are not only those indigenous to the region but those who replaced experienced departed ones not because they have a natural zeal for teaching but because they want to benefit from overseas training and conferences provided by the Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund) through tertiary institutions. The departure of experienced and qualified academic staff has culminated in the death of stuff and productivity among academic staff and students in tertiary institutions in the North-East region of Nigeria.

The transformation of Education Task Fund (ETF) into Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund) by the Federal Government of Nigeria led to rapid infrastructural development in public tertiary institution in Nigeria. Institutions in the country's North-East region including University of Maiduguri, Federal Polytechnic Mubi and Mai Idris Aloomaa Polytechnic Geidam which are three out of the four selected institutions studied are beneficiaries of the TETFund intervention. Through TETFund, several infrastructures have been developed and more are still being developed to boost the development of tertiary education in the North-East region. Boko Haram insurgency from 2015 to 2020 have led to the destruction of several facilities developed in tertiary institutions in the region to promote the development of tertiary education. Executed and ongoing projects have been destroyed by Boko Haram attacks in institutions especially in

Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states from 2015 to 2020. The insurgency has stunted the level of infrastructural development in several manners. Ongoing projects have been forced to stop in some schools due to repeated attacks. Developed facilities like Administrative block, classroom, workshop, laboratory, hostel, ICT center, library, Entrepreneur and Skill acquisition center among other have been destroyed by repeated attacks carried out by Boko Haram insurgent in Mai Idris Alooma Polytechnic Geidam. Waves of attacks coordinated and lunched by the insurgents have also left several facilities destroyed in University of Maiduguri. Federal Polytechnic Mubi hostel bombings at Wuro-Fatoji also ended in severe destruction of facilities and lives almost like the hostel attack and slaughter of several students sleeping at night in the College of Agriculture Gujba. Academic equipment like workshop machineries, laboratory tools, desktops, internet facilities, among others have been destroyed by Boko Haram insurgency especially in Mai Idris Alooma Polytechnic Geidam. Coastal and Fire Service vans as well as private vehicles have also been burnt down to ashes at the Polytechnic in Geidam as a result of repeated attacks by Boko Haram insurgents. Academic activities have refused to stabilize or normalize to the position it was before the insurgency started in the North-East region.

MAJOR FINDINGS

The study found that:

- There is a negative correlation between Boko Haram insurgency and the development of tertiary education in Nigeria's North-East region.
- The rate of students' enrollment in tertiary institutions in North-East Nigeria has reduced seriously from 2015 to 2020 due to Boko Haram insurgency.
- Applicants from other regions of Nigeria do not like to seek for admission in tertiary institutions in North-East Nigeria because of Boko Haram insurgency.
- Due to Boko Haram insurgency, majority of the students' in tertiary institutions in North-East Nigeria are indigenous to the locality where the schools are established.
- The learning environment is not conducive for students' of tertiary institutions in Nigeria's North-East region due to Boko Haram insurgency.
- Psychological trauma amounting from fear of unexpected attack by Boko Haram insurgents affects students' concentration and attention to studies in tertiary institutions in Nigeria's North-East region.
- Boko Haram insurgency have obstructed academic calendar in tertiary institutions in North-East Nigeria from 2015 to 2020.
- The level of students' performances in examinations has been poor from 2015 to 2020 in tertiary institutions in Nigeria's North-East

region from 2015 to 2020 as a result of Boko Haram insurgency.

- Several qualified and experienced academic staff have left institutions in North-East Nigeria to schools outside the region from 2015 to 2020 due to Boko Haram insurgency.
- Shortage of experienced academic staff and the replacement of departed ones with inexperienced ones has affected teaching standard and quality in tertiary institutions' in North-East Nigeria.
- The lives of academic staff and those of their families are at risk and not secured in tertiary institutions in Nigeria's North-East region due to Boko Haram insurgency.
- Risk allowance is not given to academic staff in tertiary institutions in North-East Nigeria and their lives are not covered by insurance.
- Boko Haram insurgency from 2015 to 2020 have led to the destruction of academic facilities developed to promote the growth of tertiary education in North-East Nigeria.
- Executed and ongoing capital projects aimed at developing tertiary education in North-East Nigeria have been destroyed by repeated attacks carried out by Boko Haram insurgents from 2015 to 2020.
- Infrastructural development has been stunted in tertiary institutions in North East region from 2015 to 2020 due to Boko Haram insurgency.
- Boko Haram insurgency has negative impact on the development of tertiary education in North-East Nigeria.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Based on the major findings made, the study arrived at the conclusion that, from 2015 to 2020, Boko Haram insurgency has negatively affected the rate of students' enrollment in tertiary institutions in Nigeria's North-East region. It also, came to the conclusion that, from 2015 to 2020, the insurgency has adversely impacted on the academic performances of tertiary institutions students' in the region. Several experienced and qualified academic staff as the study concluded, have left institutions in the region from 2015 to 2020 to schools in more secure places due to Boko Haram insurgency. The study again reached the conclusion that, from 2015 to 2020 repeated attacks by Boko Haram insurgents have led to the destruction of facilities and infrastructures in tertiary institutions in the region. Thus, the study drew the conclusion that, from 2015 to 2020, Boko Haram insurgency has impacted negatively on the development of tertiary education in North-East Nigeria.

As a result of the conclusion drawn by the study, the following recommendations are made:

- Adequate security should be provided to tertiary institutions in North-East Nigeria. Security system that involves intelligent network is more required than the present of armed military personnel's. Plain cloth intelligent officers should be deployed in larger number to institutions in the region. They should be disguisedly mix up with both the students', academic and non-academic staff as well as the entire institution community. Such interaction will make it easier to gain first-hand information on plan by Boko Haram insurgents to carry out attack on institutions in the region. It will make precaution against possible threat easier. This measure is significant hence, the insurgents are not ghosts but human and have their suicide bombers scattered among the people. As they are not known, intelligent service will help in identifying them among students' or uncovering their plans for attacks leading to adoption of necessary measures to checkmate the attacks. Adopting secret security service in institutions in the North-East region will go a long way in ameliorating the level of attacks which are making the development of higher education impossible in the region.
- Developing military camps around tertiary institutions and heaping soldiers in there, instead of securing the schools, make them vulnerable to attack by Boko Haram insurgents. In cases where such military camps have been attacked, closer institutions provided the forts into which the insurgents retrieved to escaped disproportionate use of power by the government forces. On so many attacks, government forces have provocatively made swift incursions into institutions in search and pursuance of the insurgents who have escaped into the schools and the collateral damage in many cases have been either the students' or academic facilities and infrastructures developed to promote tertiary education in Nigeria's North-East region. Several students' have been killed in cross-fire between government forces and Boko Haram insurgents while trying to escape. In other cases, if over powered, Boko Haram fighters used schools as channels for escape thereby bombing and setting facilities ablaze as a way of transferring aggression. The cases of the Polytechnic at Geidam and College of Agriculture Gujba both in Yobe state are good examples. Military camps established closer to their campuses made them vulnerable to attack by Boko Haram insurgents. Thus, in addition to effective intelligent and security service in institutions, aerial surveillance of institutions from the air is not only necessary but should be adopted. This will make regrouping for attack by Boko Haram dictated and neutralized from a far before they get closer to the institutions. This will make institutions safer for the growth of tertiary education in Nigeria's North-East region.
- Effective multi-track peace-building mechanisms should be adopted rather than military action to ending the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria's North-East region. Though Boko Haram operates mostly in a "hit and run" manner which is making it difficult to understand with whom peace deal is to be negotiated on their behalf. The government should willing request that Boko Haram nominates certain persons to negotiate with it on endurable peace and security in the region. This will lead to a safer region capable of creating conducive atmosphere for teaching and learning leading to the development of tertiary education in the region. Safer North-East region will also ameliorate the problem of attack and destruction of academic facilities as well as infrastructures meant for the development of tertiary education in the region.
- Tertiary institutions in North-East Nigeria especially in states vulnerable to Boko Haram insurgency like Adamawa, Borno and Yobe are flourished with home-based students' because several applicants non-indigenous to the region no longer apply for admission in schools in the region. But then, the home-based students' too have the right to be protected in their pursuit of tertiary education. To be sure that their lives are protected by the government, students' should be given life insurance cover showing that, the government is not only fully prepared to take responsibility for securing their lives but is also prepare to compensate their families if they lost their lives in the invent of attack by Boko Haram insurgents. Medical expenses of students' injured in cross-fire between government forces and Boko Haram insurgents should also be taken care of by the government. If the government can take such steps, it means that the government has not only accepted it responsibility of protecting the students' but it has also demonstrated that it has guaranteed the protection of students' lives to their families. This will reduce the fear of sending children to institutions in the North-East states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe on the minds of parents outside the region.
- Academic staff also deserve adequate security and maximum protection to be able to deliver their official primary and secondary responsible very well. Several among them for fear of attack by Boko Haram insurgents have left institutions in the region from 2015 to 2020. Shortage of teaching staff has made the development of tertiary education difficult. Few who have not left should be encouraged to remained. This encouragement can be done

through initiating special risk allowance package for available academic staff. Special risk allowance package for them will enable them realize the fact that the government is aware and concern about their plight and the fact that they discharged their duties under severe risk and threat promoted by Boko Haram insurgency in the region they work in.

- The lives of academic staff and those of their immediate families should be insured. Life insurance package should be provided to them by the government to enable them work with confidence that in the invent of attack on their lives or death through attack by Boko Haram insurgents, their medical expenses or life compensation will be taken care of by the government. This will prevent available academic staff from nurturing the desire of leaving institutions in the North-East region to those in other regions of Nigeria or even to outside Nigeria. Such efforts to encouraged the academic staff will reduce the occupational mobility of academic staff from the region thereby, reducing the drift of qualified and experienced academic staff from institutions in North-East Nigeria. Inexperienced and unqualified academic staff cannot lead to the development of tertiary education. Therefore, effective life insurance package for available tertiary institutions teachers' and those of their immediate families will reduced occupational mobility among them from the region and thus, lead to the development of tertiary education in the region.
- The North-East Development Commission (NEDC) established and charged with the responsibility of human capital and infrastructural development in Nigeria's North-East region should extend investment in infrastructural development to public tertiary institutions in the region especially in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states to corroborate the effort of the Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TETFund) already involved actively in infrastructural development in public tertiary institutions in the region. This will result in rapid infrastructural development in tertiary institutions in the region. Destroyed academic facilities meant for the development of tertiary education in the region can be restored in institutions which they have been destroyed. The insurgency has left engineering workshops, entrepreneur development centers, Information and Communication Technology (ICT) centers, laboratories, classrooms and even administrative blocks and offices destroyed in some institutions in the region especially in the three most affected states. TETFund is doing its best in rebuilding these facilities and even coming up with new projects in tertiary

institutions in the region. Additional support and investment in the area of infrastructural development by the NEDC will result in the adequacy of academic facilities and infrastructures which will in turn, lead to development of tertiary education in North-East Nigeria.

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