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Islamic Propagation and the Threat of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism (Rve) in Southern Africa Examining the Vulnerabilities of Zimbabwe

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Abstract: *The evolution of terrorist activities in Mozambique in the second decade of the 21ˢᵗ century changed the international perspectives on the threat of terrorism. The development led to the realisation that Radicalization to Violent Extremism (RVE) is no longer confined to its traditional regions, primarily, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), but is gradually becoming a global threat to international peace and security. The developments brought to light the insight that there are no consecrated states or regions to this threat. To this end, this paper investigates some of the critical and subtle factors that most countries that believe that they are safe from the threat of RVE should always be vigilant about. To achieve this, the paper uses the case of Zimbabwe, a neighboring country to Mozambique. Zimbabwe is perceived to be experiencing relative peace and stability from a security point of view. The study used references from the global experiences in various regions to explain the vulnerabilities of Zimbabwe in respect of the threat of RVE. This study, therefore, advances the argument that permeability of boundaries, religious reluctances, geographic location, regional conflicts, political polarization, high levels of unemployment, economic constraints f, uneven distribution of resources by those in power, limited knowledge and experience among state security agencies on the threat of RVE and the lack of cooperation among Southern African Development Community (SADC) are among the key factors likely to expose Zimbabwe to the threat of RVE. The study further proposed recommendations in the same spirit*.

Keywords: Terrorism, violent extremism, foreign Terrorist Fighters, Radicalisation, Zimbabwe.

INTRODUCTION

The September 11 terror attack in the United States of America (USA) saw a huge securitisation of the issue of RVE by not only the USA, but all major powers, regional and international organisations. In that spirit, the UNSC resolution 1373 and 1624 of 2001 and 200 correspondingly provided for the need by nation states and regional organisations to enhance their fight against the threat of terrorism (UNCTC 2020). Besides, the continued acts by the then largest global terrorist organisation, Al-Qaida and the effects of the post 9/11 attacks was the emergence of new violent extremist organisations chief amongst them being the Islamic State (IS) whose activities threatened global peace and security around 2014 (Ibrahimi 2018). Marongwe (2015) notes that Africa experienced a spike in terrorist incidents at the rate of approximately 6% since the 1990s with the influence of the 2011 Arab Springs in North Africa, activities of al Shabaab in East Africa and the Boko Haram in West Africa. While terrorism in African has been outpouring through these organisations, there has been less of active terrorist activity in Central and Southern Africa. The recent pledging of allegiance by the Allied Democratic Force/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF/NALU) based in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as an affiliate terrorist organisation of the IS in 2017 as well as the rise in violent terrorist attacks in the Northern Province of Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, in the same year, can be argued to have marked the genesis of terrorism in Southern Africa. In this regard, there has been boosted fears among Southern African countries as the traditionally enjoyed "peace" seem to be waning fast. Against this background, this study sought to interrogate the social, political, economic and regional factors likely to expose Zimbabwe to the threat of RVE and related effects such as recruitment of local and Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs).

METHODOLOGY

To achieve its aim, the study depended upon evidence obtained from document review, casual, discussions, observations and primary sources. The study was purely qualitative and, therefore, the research utilised content and text analysis to classify the data obtained (Sixpence and Chilunjika 2020). The data in this research was therefore organised depending in that orderly manner although not necessarily under various subheadings. The same approach was used to identify the critical recommendations on how Zimbabwe can enhance its security and compromise the threat of RVE. Thematic analysis was used for the purposes of analysing and presenting the data.

DISCUSSION

The Concept of Radicalization to Violent Extremism (RVE)

Radicalization and Violent Extremism are among the loosely defined terms in International Peace and Security Studies. In fact, the SADC, the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) among other Regional and International Organisations do not have an official definition of the two terms. According to Glazzard and Zeuthen (2016), the USAID defines Violent Extremism as, "advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic or political objectives." Whilst there exist a varied range of models of radicalisation explaining the forces of RVE, there exist no single definition to the subject. Additionally, a number of models have been used to explain the processes involved in RVE and these include among others, the Borum's Four-Stage Model of the Terrorist Mindset, Moghaddam's Staircase to Terrorism, the NYPD Model of Jihadization and the Precht's Model of a "Typical" Radicalization Pattern (Borum 2012).

This research explored the harmonies that exist across the majority, if not all the models which acknowledging that radicalisation is a processes comprising of multiple activities occurring in a generic sequential order whose details varies, however, from one model to another. To this end, this research realised that there is also a good covenant among authorities to the effect that there are common causes towards the establishment of violent extremist tendencies by individuals or groups. For purposes of this study, the Precht's Model of a "Typical" Radicalization Pattern was used as a guiding model to explain RVE. The Precht's Model classifies the processes into four stages that agreeably accommodate most models regardless of the datum that other models like the Moghaddam's Staircase model contains six stairs going up from ground to fifth floor (Francis 2012).


Fig 1. Precht's Model of a "Typical" Radicalization
Source: Borum (2012)

While this model clearly shows that there are distinct stages through which an individual or group of people go through from the pre-radicalization to the stage of actual acts of terrorism, this research advances the notion that the stages are intertwined and cannot be separated from one another. That being the case, this paper advance the assumption that the situation in Zimbabwe is characterised by no acts of actual terrorism but there exist conditions or even acts in some instances, of conversions and identification with radical Islam.

To explain this further, this research depends upon the Crenshaw's model which summarises the causes of RVE. The model groups these factors into situational, ideological and individual factors (Francis 2012, Crenshaw 1981). For the purposes of this study, the model of typical radicalisation and the Crenshaw grouping of causes of RVE are used to analyses data on the vulnerabilities of Zimbabwe against the threat of RVE.

Zimbabwe and the Threat of Radicalisation to Violent Extremism (RVE)

Zimbabwe has not recorded a case of radicalisation activity or the acts of violent extremism linked in any way to the regional and global terrorist activities. The country has, like any other country across the world, witnessed incidents of politically motivated violence in one way or the other. While Zimbabwe has enjoyed negative terrorist related peace, this section discusses the factors in and around Zimbabwe that need to be given a heightened security attention considering the evolutions witnessed by terrorist organisations around the world.

The geographical location of the country is of critical relevance to the understanding of the vulnerabilities, if any, that Zimbabwe is exposed to the possible threats related to RVE. Firstly, Zimbabwe is a landlocked country whose access to the Sea is only through third part jurisdictions. Secondly, Zimbabwe is at the center of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Region. Simuyemba (1994) alluded that, "Zimbabwe's international traffic is carried via South African ports and the Mozambican ports of Beira and Maputo". Zimbabwe also use Tanzania's Dar es Salaam, Namibia's Walvis Bay and South Africa' Port Elizabeth and Durban Port. Such a development means that Zimbabwe does not have sea portal control on the immigrants who are always in transit at Sea Ports.

This setup makes it an arduous task for the Zimbabwean authorities to protect the territory against immigrants from beyond the region exposing the country to threats associated with hosting immigrants from Middle East, North Africa, Asia, and even Europe who can easily be accepted at Sea Ports as being transit visitors before using irregular entry mechanism into Zimbabwe. To this end, Zimbabwe remains directly affected by the developments in the Cabo Delgado Province of Mozambique and, there is every possible resourcefulness that some of the people from the terrorist endangered region of Mozambique can sneak into Zimbabwe the same way they have been crossing into the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Tanzania.

With regards to the second observation, this paper realised that the central location of Zimbabwe makes it a transit state linking the regional states on road and rail. Zimbabwe has the highest number of regional neighbors as compared to all other SADC states, sharing international boundaries with six of the 14 states. Accordingly, Zimbabwe witnesses the transit for traffic to all regional countries and including, Eswatini, and Malawi among others. Some transiting traffic go beyond the direct borders to other SADC countries such as the DRC, Kenya and Somalia. Correspondingly, Zimbabwe is a source and destiny of irregular migrants in the region. For instance, the Conversation (2020) insinuates that figures from 2011 statistics in South Africa shows that:

> "...illegal migrants were about 4.2% of the total population, or about 2.1 million people. Over 75% came from the African continent, with the majority, (68%), from within the SADC region. Over 45% of those from the SADC region were Zimbabweans".

These issues, indicate how Zimbabwe can easily be targeted for by people from across the region for the purposes of Islamic Propagation, establishment of sleeper cells, Radicalization and even recruitment for local and FTFs.

Relatedly, the historical links between Zimbabwe and the confirmed hosts of terrorist organisations in Southern Africa, DRC and Mozambique, are a worrying factor to consider. The relationship between Zimbabweans and Mozambicans dates back to prior the colonial era of both countries. According to Jakwa (2017),

> "... the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) has consistently enjoyed close relations with Mozambique's FRELIMO. The two liberation movements shared a socialist ideology and Mozambique hosted ZANU guerrillas during Zimbabwe's independence struggle".

To this effect, Zimbabwe enjoys the services of the Beira Port and subsequently established the Feruka pipe to transport fuel into the country in 1966 (Masekesa 2014). During Zimbabwe's war of liberation, the country's freedom fighters stayed and trained in Mozambique. Post-independence, Zimbabwe hosted hundreds of thousands of Mozambican refugees of the civil war between the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) and FRELIMO before the signing of the Rome Peace Accords in early 1990s (Jakwa 2017).

All these developments, together with the porosity of the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border created a large Trans-Boundary Communities (TBCs) which remains difficult to manage (Ibid). Monitoring the movements of people in these TBCs is on its own a unique challenge characterising the Mozambique-Zimbabwe boundary. These communities are difficult and costly to monitor making it demanding to observe possible activities of RVE. Muslim organisations are known to exploit societies with mixed identities, peripheral publics and those communities deemed backward. In the Middle East, the activities of the IS in the Syria-Turkey border, far from both Ankara and Damascus, also points to the compromised control of the periphery by the center. In the Syria-Turkey case, Salam (2020) notes that the establishment of the self-administered authority of Rojava by the self-styled Democratic Federation of Northern Syria (DFNS) was necessitated by the core-periphery effect. The subsequent invasion of the region by Turkey in 2019 to create the "safe zone" was influenced by alleged effort by Turkey to destroy the TBC and create a buffer zone.

The activities in the Kivhu Province of the DRC, some 2 600km from the capital Kinshasa, and at the confluence of Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda are a good example. The activities of Boko Haram in the Sambisa border forest, at the confluence of, Cameroon, Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) is also related to the peripheral effects of TBCs. In Mozambique, Islamic propagation started slowly and steadily in Cabo Delgado province, some more than 3 000km from both Maputo and Dar es Salaam while hardly accessible to Moroni through the Indian Ocean.

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These and many other examples show that RVE as well as recruitment of FTFs thrive in TBCs. This paper, therefore notes that the existence of similar communities along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border, coupled with the spongy security situation in the same areas should not be left unattended as this have an acute effect to the threats in question.

Additionally, this study establishes that Zimbabwe hosts a huge sum of Congolese nationals most of whom came as refugees of the DRC war of 1998. Chikanda and Crunch (2016) indicated that during the DRC's civil war, Zimbabwe established refugee camps to host Congolese nationals and continued to have the Tongogara refugee camp in Manicaland Province's Chipinge along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique boundary. While these refugees remain in the camp for more than 20 years since 1998, most of them have since moved from that confinement to the capital and major cities around the country. Some have since changed their citizenship while others married locals but maintain relations with their kin and kith in the DRC. To add on this new social fabric, a Zim-Trading Post (2019) indicates that Zimbabwe and the DRC enjoy warm diplomatic relations as they are members of SADC and the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and, since the DRC war, there has been an increased trade between the two countries. The substance of the matter at this juncture is to the effect that it becomes difficult for the Zimbabwean establishment to conduct security vetting on the DRC nationals travelling into the country. To this effect, there is a virgin danger that violent Islamic elements currently operating in Eastern DRC can take as an option, Zimbabwe, for purposes of Islamic propagation, radicalization, recruitment and even establishment of sleeper cells in the country without detection.

Another area identified to be developing to have a related effect is that of the link between Tanzania and Zimbabwe through the services of the port of Dar es Salaam. The security uncertainties in Mozambique due to the violent activities of RENAMO in the post 2000 coupled with the perceived strict policies on Japanese vehicles in South Africa have made the port of Dar es Salaam a port of choice for majority of Zimbabweans who import Japanese cars as well as other goods such as clothing and electoral appliances (UNCTAD 2012). Worrying is the role of Tanzania in the evolution of the Islamic propagation and violent extremism in the Southern African region considering that Tanzania has been instrumental in the movement of fighters in the DRC and Mozambique as evidenced by arrest of Tanzanian citizens suspected of being part of the terrorists in Mozambique. Tanzania has also been a link between the Southern African and the Eastern Africa particularly Kenya and Somalia. The picture, while looking so good in the name of development, should be

worrying for Zimbabwe if viewed in the lenses of security chiefly with regards to the fruition of RVE.

Political polarisation is one other key elements noted by this study to be at the epicenter of the facilities required for RVE and possibly recruitment of FTFs. This is so considering the flimsiness of the line separating political from religious violent extremism. The outcome of general elections in Zimbabwe since the turn up to the new millennium as well as the continued contestation of the same by major political parties in the country is a worrying factor towards the fight against the possibility of RVE. While the first post-Mugabe elections held in 2018 was characterised by a tolerant political environment, Pigou (2018) noted that, "The results, however, confirmed that the country is deeply divided, with the opposition contesting the Electoral Commission's determination that Emmerson Mnangagwa won the presidency." The electoral results in Zimbabwe has shown that the electorate is heavily divided between the main rival parties, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and the ruling ZANU PF. ZESN (2018) provides that

> *"For the presidential election, Zimbabwe uses the majoritarian or two-round voting system. This means that the winner must garner 50% + 1 of the votes to avoid a second round or a run-off. If no candidate gets the required 50%+ 1 vote there is a second round of voting."*

The election of 2018 was critical as the incumbent won by a decimal above the 50%+1 vote constitutional requirement. In this case, the results reflected the existence of a very powerful opposition political force whose voice cannot be ignored. The mood in the country has been worsened by the continued existence of election related disputes. To this end, the country has remained in an election mood since 2000 regardless of whether there are pending elections or not.

Religious radicalisation, violent extremism and recruitment of terrorist fighters thrive in areas with Economic fragility, poverty, discontentment and unemployment. This study noted that this is a critical condition prevailing in Zimbabwe. The ECICD (2020) indicates that, "Since the early 2000s, Zimbabwe has actually seen increased poverty, economic deterioration, and frequent droughts". Describing the economic situation in Zimbabwe, WBG (2019) insinuates that:

> *"The economic growth trend is now some 2% below the average of Sub-Saharan Africa, partly resulting from exchange rate misalignment, volatile weather patterns, and unsustainable fiscal deficit".*

The WB (2010) states that:
> *"Inflation surged to 521% year-on-year in December 2019, fueled by a rapid exchange*

rate depreciation, poor harvests, and reduction of subsidies on fuel and electricity".

As a result, a large professional and nonprofessional population of Zimbabwe left the country in search for greener pastures. According to Muzondidya (2011), "By 2010, estimates regarding the size of the diaspora range from 2 to 5 million with their remittances estimated at over US$1.8 billion". Economic fragility is associated with a plethora of challenges including failure to access social services and amenities and the most critical one is unemployment. This study, thus, realises that Zimbabwe's economic situation can easily expose it to the threat of RVE and mainly recruitment of the unemployed youths for the same purposes, locally and internationally.

The activities of the Ansar al-Sunna in Mozambique since 2017 put to test the effectiveness of the SADC's Organ on Politics Defense and Security (OPDS). Although in the first instances arguments for the failure by the organ to react to the violent activities of the militants on Mozambique has been to the effect that the government of Mozambique was characterising the incidents as being criminal and not terrorist, the acknowledgement by the Mozambican authorities in 2020 has not changed anything Frey (2020). The militants have moved to take control of numerous districts including a Mocimboa de Praia Port, killing more than 400 people and leading to the emergence of between 100 000 and 300 000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) (Latham 2020). Unfortunately, no visible action has been recorded from both the AU and the SADC. Indications are that the OPDS is acting carefully to prevent the occurrence of a situation similar to that of the DRC and Lesotho cases in which the SADC members were divided on basis of military interventions. Military assistance from individual regional states also remains a challenge from such experience. For instance, the British government reached out to Zimbabwe asking for such move but the later demanded that the US sanctions on Zimbabwe be removed as a condition for Zimbabwe's intervention in the neighboring Mozambique (Ibid).

Whatever the case might be, it is crucial to note that regional coalitions are of relevance in fighting terrorism. Although there are challenges to that effect, the role of military arrangements such as that of Russia and Turkey in Syria; the African Union Mission (AMISOM) in Somalia; the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Chad Basin are all indicative to the need to a cleave in the fight against RVE (Wojtowicz, et al 2019; Williams 2013; ICG 2020). The situation in Southern Africa, however, as different as it appears, all member states are not prepared to assist militarily in Mozambique. Having the terrorist influence continuing to explode in Mozambique does not sound safe to the neighboring Zimbabwe. It can be noted that

Zimbabwe suffered a lot of military attacks during the Mozambique civil war pitting the government and the opposition armed forces of between 1976 and 1992. This analysis argues that Southern African countries, continue to be at an acute risk from the possible ripple expansion of RVE if there is no will among SADC states in fighting violent extremism in Mozambique. Besides, the situation is worsened by the absence of a regional standby force in the SADC which is also among the key issues that threatens the security of member states against the threat of RVE. The experiences of Zimbabwe during the civil war in Mozambique shows that the country cannot be considered to be immune to the developments in Mozambique. This, therefore raises fears on the safety of Zimbabwe from the threat of radicalization and violent extremism likely to be exported by militants in Mozambique.

This analysis realises that like color revolutions, instigators of RVE depend hugely on politicising and spiritualising local conflict history to gain audience and acceptance from among the local population (Berzina 2014). Literature is awash with information on how radical Islamic doctrines also flourish on the prevalence of struggles. The rise of the IS activities in countries affected by the Arab Springs is a good substantiation to that in general. Precisely, countries such as Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen had political conflicts that bred RVE. Yugoslavia, though being in a different region altogether, had similar experiences years after the conflicts of the late 1990s (Sixpence and Chilunjika 2020). In the case of Mozambique, terrorist activities followed the long period of civil fighting between the armed RENAMO and the government (Jakwa 2017). Besides the role of such conflicts in facilitating the proliferation of small arms and allowing for the life of paramilitary trained residence, there is also the effect of failure by authorities to fully resolve conflicts thereby creating fissures later used by proponents of radical Islamic teachings for RVE.

Pursuant to the forgoing, this study also realises that there are a number of shelved conflicts in Zimbabwe. Chief among these include the 15 year long liberation war that ended in 1979 through the Lancaster House Conference (LHC). The conflict was instrumental in the eruption of yet another conflict in 2000 through the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) which the government of Zimbabwe is still battling. Zimbabwe's land reform is arguably the basis on the US imposition of the Zimbabwe Democracy for Economic Recovery Act (ZDERA) of 2001. In 2020, the government of Zimbabwe and representatives of the former white farmers who lost land through the FTLRP signed the Global Compensation Deed (GCD) in an effort to extricate this frozen conflict (Kwaramba 2020). The GCD motivated a critical debate and is suspected to result in fresh land related conflicts in the country.

Similarly, three years after attainment of independence, Zimbabwe experienced another conflict spiting the Shona dominated government and the Ndebele dominated opposition political party, PF ZAPU (Cameron 2017). In that conflict, hundreds of people from Matabeleland region in South Western part of the country were killed (Ibid). The conflict, known as *Gukurahundi,* remains a source of conflict between the government and the people from this region and has been politicised by nearly all opposition initiatives in the country since then regardless of the peace agreement having been concluded in 1987 by the warring parties. Findings from the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Zimbabwe (2018), shows that the same conflict has also been politicised by secessionist proponents of the Mthwakazi Movements in Matabeleland. Who are of the conviction that the issue of Gukurahundi was addressed in an elitist way as opposed to a grassroots oriented strategy as evidenced by the signing of the 1987 Unity Accord is an elitist pact between two parties at the expense of the grassroots.

According to Madembwe et al (2005), another critical conflict in the contemporary Zimbabwe is the 2005 Operation Restore Order (ORO) also known as Operation *Murambatsvina* which saw hundreds of thousands of urban dwellers losing their houses through demolitions. According to the Zimbabwe Legal Information Institute (ZIMLII) (2019), Zimbabwe has also faced multiple election related conflicts with all elections held in 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2013 and 2018 having been tainted with acts of violence, sabotage and contestations (Sixpence et al 2021). The complexity of the shelved conflicts in Zimbabwe should be worrying to the authorities as they expose the country to the threats of propagation of radical Islamic faiths as well as radicalisation, violent extremism and recruitment of FTFs.

This study also realizes that there is a brewing danger from the prisons and detention centers around the country. Mulcahy et al (2013) insinuates that,

> "Throughout history, prisons have served as recruitment centers and headquarters for ideological extremists (such as Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler), where they used their time behind bars to develop extremist philosophies and recruit others into their mode of thinking".

Prisons provide an environment of a high rate of criminals, some of whom have no hope in being accepted back into the same societies that incarcerated them (Mhlanga et al 2020). These hopeless inmates are critical in radial ideologies and can easily be recruited to such violent doctrines. The stiff conditions common in most prisons across developing countries provides an apt opportunity for propagation of radical ideologies. Prisons can be used to facilitate the transfer of funds for funding terrorist activities, used for recruitment, training

and even distribution of radical Islamic material to convicts (ibid).

The conditions of the Zimbabwean prisons are no different to other prisons in and around the region. Zimbabwean prisons have visible healthcare challenges posing a grave risk to women and children in prison (ibid). The economic situation prevailing in Zimbabwe makes it difficult in most cases for the authorities to provide decent requirements for convicts. For instance, at the peak of the hyperinflation and economic unsteadiness in 2008, thousands of Zimbabwean prisoners would go for more than a day without a meal. In a research on prisons in Zimbabwe, Alexander (2009), alluded that one of the prison officers disclosed that,

> "we've gone the whole year in which for prisoners and prison officers' the food is hand to mouth...They'll be lucky to get one meal. Sometimes they'll sleep without. We have moving skeletons, moving graves. They're dying."

To add on this, the prisons are overcrowded and in most cases lack the sanitary requirements to uphold the population especially in the face of COVID19. Mavhinga (2020) insinuates that, "…facilities are often unsanitary, overcrowded, and have no running water in cells for detainees to comply with UN hygiene practices recommended to stem the spread of the disease". The population in the prison as of 2020 stood at 22 000 which is 5000 higher than the capacity of 17 000. To add on, the Zimbabwean prisons, like many national prisons around the world, hold inmates from other countries some of whom are from hotbeds of terrorism and radicalization. Xinhua (2018) indicates that among the imprisoned foreigners in the Zimbabwean prisons was a purported son to the late leader of Libya, Muama Qaddaffi, Abhallha Mone Moussa Moummare Qaddafi. Also, this paper notes that in some cases, the Zimbabwean authorities were keeping illegal migrants together with local inmates in prisons due to lack of facilities to keep them. Ibid, quoting the ministry of home affairs indicates that "… it was not ideal to detain prohibited immigrants in prisons, but the government was doing so because there were no safe places to keep them while they awaited deportation."

Beyond, the situation in Zimbabwe's prison should be guarded against the political activists regularly arrested and detained in the same cells. This is so because these activists, together with other foreign elements can easily mutate to create radical elements in the prisons. The majority, if not all of the prominent political activists and opposition leaders in Zimbabwe have been to these prisons and had contact with other inmates. That alone poses a threat to the nation in face of the growing threat of RVE. Considering the role of prison recruitment and radicalization from across the

world, the rise of Islamic radicalisation in the Southern African region calls for authorities to consider the prison situation as an issue of security concern beyond the traditional approach. These may include rehabilitation of inmates, provision of adequate food, sanitation, medication and other requirements. Prison security should also be intensified especially in the context of the vetting of inmates and visitors by prison authorities.

Recomendations

In light of the entire discussion in the preceding section, this study makes the following recommendations:

- ➤ The porosity of borders in Southern Africa needs an enhanced approach on border security and control at both national and regional levels;
- ➤ With regard to political polarisation and intolerance, this study recommends that the Zimbabwean government come up with more inclusive initiatives on top of the existing POLAD and other proportional representations in the legislative assembly;
- ➤ The SADC in general, and Zimbabwe in particular, being Christian dominated societies may, if not oriented properly, mistaken the Islamic religion to be synonymous with terrorism which is not true. That categorisation of Islam in itself will, if not handled well, create in-group and out-group tendencies which are critical ingredients for radicalisation. There is need for awareness campaigns on religious tolerance.
- ➤ There is need for the government and non-governmental players to address issues of unemployment amongst the youth;
- ➤ There is need to consider coming up with specific legislations to replace the implied laws on terrorism in Zimbabwe; and;
- ➤ SADC should invest in setting up a specialised counter terrorism research and development unit.
- ➤ The adherence to the principle of collective security by countries in the SADC region is key. i.e. one for all, all for one and/or injure one, injure all.
- ➤

CONCLUSION

The rising threat of RVE in most parts of the world calls for a heightened effort by authorities around the world to work against the same. Having analysed the nature and levels of the threat in Zimbabwe, this study concludes that more countries in the region need to make a similar valuations on their peace and security situation with regards to the rising and spreading threat of RVE. The recommendations given in this study are general and should be considered on a case to case basis depending on the prevailing situation in every case. This study also concludes that there are a lot of research gaps on RVE in Southern Africa considering the extraneous nature of the subject in the region.

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