



## Research Article

Volume-02|Issue-05|2021

## Reintegrating War Veterans in Post-Conflict Societies

Dr Shadreck P.M. Makombe\*

Zimbabwe Open University, Corner Samora Matchel, Leopold Takawira Street, 8 th Floor, Harare, Zimbabwe

## Article History

Received: 01.05.2021

Accepted: 15.05.2021

Published: 30.05.2021

## Citation

Makombe, S. P. M. (2021). Reintegrating War Veterans in Post-Conflict Societies. *Indiana Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, 2(5), 10-17.

**Abstract:** The researcher looked at reintegrating of war veterans in post-conflict societies. The research objectives were to assess the practical work with the economic security of war veterans and to analyse practical work with the physical security of war veterans. A qualitative approach was used in the study. The qualitative methodology was conducted and of the eligible candidates. The researcher used purposive sampling to recruit participants and semi-structured interviews were conducted with war veterans in Mutare using a tape recorder with the consent of the participants so as to capture the exact words from the participants' mouth and also used probes when interviewing to find out secret or hidden information on the issue of reintegration of war veterans and the challenges thereof. The study found out that if reintegration challenges especially the security threat that former combatants pose are not taken seriously, ex-combatants may re-engage in violence and render post-war reconstruction and peace building impossible. To deal with these challenges, donors have developed so-called reintegration programmes. Based on an inventory of different definitions, this study argues that reintegration should be seen as a societal process aiming at the economic, political, and social assimilation of ex-combatants and their families into civil society. It was recommended that targeted support to ex-warring parties is best warranted if the government represent a security risk to the new peace order.

**Keywords:** Post-Conflict, War Veterans, Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration.

**Copyright © 2021 The Author(s):** This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0).

## INTRODUCTION

In the beyond 25 years, Zimbabwe have evolved unique programmes to address the challenges posed through demobilised veterans. These have usually aimed at the monetary and social assimilation of warfare veterans into civilian existence and have been grouped underneath the heading reintegration of warfare veterans. Despite the growing interest given to reintegration efforts, our understanding of the trouble continues to be limited, in particular compared to the greater well-known regions of disarmament and demobilisation. To make our work more effective, it's far essential to sum up current information and check what demanding situations reintegration approaches face in the destiny. The reason of this take a look at is consequently threefold:

- How do we define reintegration?
- What theoretical explanations are there for explaining when reintegration is successful?
- Based on our theoretical knowledge and experiences from different reintegration processes, how can we make reintegration efforts more effective?

The reintegration of war veterans is a necessary part of the demilitarisation of post-conflict societies. While institutions based totally on democratic norms and the rule of regulation need to update military ones, armies must be demobilised and veterans disarmed.

A right demilitarisation is vital to create an environment of consider and security between former belligerents, that is crucial for any peace process to be successful. It additionally allows scarce assets, needed

for financial reconstruction, to be redirected from the navy quarter to greater effective ones. Demilitarisation, however, no longer handiest solves troubles. It also generates new demanding situations. As countrywide armies and guerrilla companies demobilise, big numbers of unemployed soldiers and guerrilla fighters are launched into civilian existence. This implies a notable pressure for society. First, dissatisfied former veterans frequently grow to be a security chance, as they will rearm themselves or come to be in different styles of crime. Second, the atrocities dedicated by way of war veterans may additionally create excessive tensions with civilians who have suffered at their arms. Finally, sure categories of war veterans, which includes woman struggle veterans and toddler squaddies, are in particular inclined and can want precise styles of help for humanitarian reasons. If those demanding situations, especially the safety threat that former veterans pose, aren't taken critically, battle veterans may also re-have interaction in violence, rendering put up-conflict reconstruction and peace constructing impossible.

In Zimbabwe, for example, the organisation for struggle veterans has used violence against white farmers (Colletta *et al.*, 2004:177-179). The principal dilemma with veterans' enterprises is that while they are created to do away with the grievances war veterans, they're dependent on the continuation of the reintegration trouble with a purpose to survive (Schafer, 1998:209). Supporting veterans' firms need to therefore be seen as a temporary solution. In the longer term it's miles better to inspire struggle veterans to participate in politics as normal civilians. It is also vital to make sure that war

veterans have access to the political institutions of the kingdom. Before the first national elections are held, after the cease of hostilities, it may be essential to create strength-sharing preparations. In such an institutional makeup, all events to the conflict are represented inside the country wide government. The parties can thereby manage each other, making them experience much less susceptible to wonder assaults (Snyder & Jervis, 1999:18; & Walter, 1999:46-49). This can be a very good way to make war veterans on all aspects sense secure, have confidence within the peace procedure, and feature leaders within the government who represent their pursuits.

### **Defining War Veterans**

There is a shocking loss of definitions for the term war veteran. When managing disarming, demobilising and reintegrating struggle veterans, the United Nations officially considers that fighters emerge as battle veterans when they may be registered as disarmed (UN, 1999:52). This, but, is of little use because it says nothing approximately who should be recognized as a fighter or veteran. It is therefore vital to first establish what a veteran is. While a consensus exists of what a veteran is in interstate wars, there is no clear definition regarding intrastate wars. In global conflicts, veterans are taken into consideration to be contributors of country wide armed forces, where there exists an identifiable organization, a clear command structure, and an inner disciplinary system. Such a definition is not usually relevant in intrastate wars.

That means of the term war veteran has been transformed in Zimbabwe. Different human beings masked by using their political affiliation check with themselves as struggle veterans for you to gather benefits from ZANU-PF. According to Kriger (2003:23), since independence, veterans, different liberation activists, the media and the party used a discourse approximately who's an genuine veteran as a political weapon. When veterans criticised the authorities, ZANU PF labelled them "inauthentic" veterans or puzzled their credentials considering fighters have been disciplined and need to no longer undertaking the celebration (Gamba, 2003:154), This turned into obvious while Zimbabwe Liberators Platform (ZLP) led by using Wilfred Mhanda whose nom de guerre became Dzinashé Machingura criticised the 2000 amnesty granted through President Mugabe on the idea that it became meant to shield, "ZANU-PF supporters who had been utilized by an unpopular regime that wanted to hold on to strength in any respect prices"(Bendana, 1997:478).

Reacting to the utterances, the then ZNLWVA secretary for projects said, "These human beings are pressured. I do no longer suppose they belong to ZANU-PF. Hunzvi leads actual struggle veterans" (Dikongue-Atangana, 2004:78). The running definition of struggle veteran(s) used in this paper is contained inside the War Veterans Act in which a warfare veteran is: someone who

underwent navy education and participated, constantly and consistently, within the liberation war, which took place in Zimbabwe and neighbouring nations between 1 January 1962 and 29 February 1980 in connection with bringing about Zimbabwe's independence on 18 April 1980 (Lyons, 2004:12). Having charted a definition on who's a struggle veteran inside the Zimbabwean case, we now address even though in short how the demobilisation method turned into executed.

Many guerrilla agencies and paramilitary forces lack each a clear command structure and corporation. The global community therefore emphasises whether the character has taken an immediate component within the hostilities. To have without delay taken part commonly way that they've dedicated acts that have been intended to purpose damage to enemy personnel and cloth (Lindsey, 2001:26). One should therefore argue that a battle veteran is a person who has taken direct part in the hostilities on behalf of one of the combatants and has been registered as disarmed. However, using a definition that only takes into attention veterans who undergo the official disarmament and demobilisation channels excludes many real fighters. First, it's far not unusual that veterans from sure armed agencies are not regarded as proper veterans for political motives. This can result in large numbers of veterans no longer being entitled to reintegration assistance (OECD, 2004:236).

Civilians who personal guns, alternatively, frequently pretend to be veterans if you want to receive DD&R benefits (Colletta & Ingo 2004:47). Third, it happens that a few veterans aren't registered due to inaccuracies in the information series. It is estimated that 40% of the veterans in us of a which includes Namibia did not get hold of reintegration benefits due to such troubles. Finally, self-demobilisation is quite common. This can take numerous paperwork. During official demobilisation, veterans who fear for his or her security may additionally choose now not to turn up at meeting regions. Armies and guerrilla organizations might also begin to dissolve earlier than formal demobilisation begins, due to low morale and faltering command structures. This can result in big numbers of veterans returning domestic, without registering themselves (Peace as Disappointment, 2002:6).

A definition tied to formal approaches of disarmament and demobilisation would therefore exclude these classes of veterans. This is elaborate when you consider that non-official struggle veterans have a tendency to pose a critical safety danger, as they may be regularly recruited through armed actors who have not demobilised (Sawyer, 2004:78). If donors are severe about increasing safety in publish-conflict societies, the aim of DDR processes must additionally be to save you veterans who fall outdoor the official DDR channels from taking to palms and to entice folks that do again through extraordinary incentives.

### Research Objectives

- To assess the practical work with the economic security of war veterans
- To analyse practical work with the physical security of war veterans

## A THREAT TO SECURITY

In the Republic of Congo, it is a not unusual phenomenon that war veterans rearm themselves on the way to in addition their political demands (Alden, 2002:89). There are as a minimum two approaches in which they could try this. First, war veterans are frequently recruited through paramilitary squads or guerrilla agencies that stand outside the peace manner and refuse to demobilise, so-called spoilers (Mehlum, 1997:362). A Ninja splinter group that had refused to demobilise and become led via Frédéric Bitsangou Ntumi attacked the suburbs of Brazzaville in 2002. During the assault, Ntumi recruited many ex-Ninjas who have been demobilised in 2000 (IRIN, Febr. 2, 2004).

A second hazard is that warfare veterans recreate disbanded guerrilla agencies or navy units and undertaking the postwar order with hands, which at worst can lead to open riot (Gamba, 2003:126; Kingma, 1999:10; & Spear, 2002:146). In the early 1990s demobilised Contra rebels and Nicaraguan government soldiers (Sandinistas) recreated new armed groups called "Recontras" and "Recompas". These organizations not handiest used fingers to strain the authorities into giving them reintegration help, in addition they fought every other (Spencer, 1997:25-26). A related hassle is whilst war veterans lend or sell their military services to armed actors concerned in wars in overseas countries. Former veterans fighting for monetary repayment or for ideological persuasions have played a vital role within the diffusion of numerous armed conflicts. Demobilised soldiers of the South African Defence Force (SADF) have fought as mercenaries in both Angola and Sierra Leone (Kingma, 1999:7) whilst former contributors of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).

### War veterans as a Weak and Marginalised Group

After being demobilised, some classes of warfare veterans constitute a weak and marginalised organization in want of monetary, mental and social assistance as a way to live on. This is specifically true for toddler soldiers, and female and disabled war veterans in Zimbabwe. Making certain that such assistance is given poses a first-rate task to nearby communities and international donors. Unemployment and the need for war veterans to find opportunity method of supporting themselves and their families often include demobilisation. Since veteran's principal had been educated to fight, most warfare veterans lack applicable activity capabilities. The skills that they received for the duration of their stay within the armed groups are seldom in demand at the process marketplace. Furthermore, most people have very little formal schooling. This makes it

difficult for war veterans to find employment inside the quick-term (Kingma, 2000a:18;). The truth that demobilised veterans regularly gather households and dependents at some stage in the struggle, provides to their stress (Collier, 1994:344).

Wartime reports naturally additionally affect the fitness of war veterans. In Zimbabwe a big part of the demobilised veterans have been HIV/AIDS superb (Kingma, 2000:232). A more not unusual trouble is the need to care for disabled struggle veterans. In Ethiopia, the struggle between Ethiopia and Eritrea, for example, led to approximately 18,000 disabled veterans at the Ethiopian side alone. Caring for disabled struggle veterans is often a heavy burden for war-torn societies that lack sufficient sources (Colletta, 2004:171). War veterans also typically suffer from psychological pressure due to struggle trauma. As veterans they will have achieved, suffered from, or witnessed horrible violence that left deep mental scars which ought to be dealt with (Kingma, 1999:8;). Because of the pressure associated with collaborating in fighting, many veterans begin the usage of alcohol and capsules. Once peace arrives, it is anticipated that as many as 25%-30% of all veterans are serious drug abusers (Mueller, 2003:509).

It is the existence of these three demanding situations this is the rationale for giving targeted reintegration help to war veterans. In their absence former veterans can be handled as regular civilians. Reintegration assistance is therefore only warranted if demobilised veterans pose a protection hazard to the brand new peace order; if the atrocities that they will have devoted can create conflict-generating rifts in society; or if sure classes of warfare veterans cannot assist themselves attributable to financial, political, or social marginalisation.

### Practical Work with the Physical Security of War veterans

The most insecure duration for struggle veterans is when they're discharged from their military devices and go back to civilian life. This is especially genuine for former guerrillas in Zimbabwe. Having handed in their weapons, they are prone to harassment from army and police forces and vengeful civilians. An obvious way to alleviate such fears is to contain guerrilla companies, or elements of them, into the national defence force. Power sharing within the navy and the police may be an amazing way for the opponents to make certain that they may not be uncovered to wonder assaults. Such arrangements are also beneficial for those warfare veterans who are not incorporated, because it will increase the transparency of and their confidence within the security forces. Military mergers have efficiently prevented reoccurrence of struggle in Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe (Call & Stanley, 2003:212-15, 219-20). Mergers can, however, be complex. First, it can be difficult to create a unified country wide navy via an army merger. This is

specifically genuine if the army systems of the merging parties are left intact.

The end result may be that old warlords retain their influence, whereby armies are handiest countrywide on paper. Such an improvement can be seen in Afghanistan, where armed organizations have been formally included into the navy, without relinquishing any manipulate of their nearby command structure (Dagens & Nyheter, 2004). Second, it isn't uncommon that guerrilla groups and authority's forces aren't sufficiently downsized previous to their merger, creating oversized new armies. This is once in a while important in the short-time period, mainly in conditions where the mistrust between former belligerents is simply too high. In Cambodia, for instance, the armed forces swelled at some stage in the 1990s because of army mergers.

It changed into now not until 2001, whilst the political scenario had stabilised, that the authorities started out demobilising the militia (Cambodia, 2004:142). At instances, it could also be wise to delay demobilising over-sized armies until the financial state of affairs is greater conducive to absorbing battle veterans. Such a put off facilitated the reintegration of war veterans in Uganda. In the lengthy-time period, but, it isn't feasible for war-torn nations to support outsized armies. Having over dimensioned militia may additionally even constitute a protection threat. In Chad and Guinea-Bissau, countries that have been not able or unwilling to carry out any larger demobilisation, unpaid infantrymen had been involved in violence towards the state (IRIN).

### **The Economic Security of War veterans**

One of the main benefits of participating in warfare is the opportunity for financial gain. Some authors argue that the vital intention of insurrection is economic profit, especially via the unlawful taxation of natural resources for export (Collier, 2000:839, 852). Even though other factors may also explain the outbreak of violence, financial issues may also end up more vital with time. In a few civil wars, an financial hobby in persevering with the battle at a profitable degree may update defeating the enemy as the principle goal (Berdal & Malone, 2000:2, 6). Taking element in struggle can also be profitable for the person. Being a veteran guarantees a certain earnings both in the shape of a salary or from looting.

The use of violence will also be a manner to benefit get admission to to land, water and mineral resources via forcing unique proprietor's away (Berdal, 1996:31). According to a majority of students, making sure the monetary safety of battle veterans is the most decisive component in the put up-demobilisation segment. If former soldiers and guerrilla fighters lack approach of securing their financial survival as civilians, there is an excessive possibility that they may take in palms again (Özerdem, 2002:962). The quality manner

of doing that is to offer warfare veterans with meaningful occupations whereby they are able to aid themselves and their families (Berdal, 2002:96).

### **Practical Work with the Economic Security of War veterans**

Efforts to permit battle veterans and their households to help themselves can be divided into three stages. The first section goals at securing their instant survival until they can offer for themselves. This is accompanied with the aid of an intermediate length that seeks to provide battle veterans the capabilities, understanding and statistics to allow them to guide themselves. The final degree is attaining monetary self-sufficiency thru manufacturing or gainful employment. Lacking income and employment, battle veterans and their dependents are often unable to assist themselves after demobilisation. This necessitates the advent of so called reinsertion packages which could assist them triumph over the difficult duration among demobilisation and complete financial assimilation into civil society. Reinsertion programs can consist of something from coins' payments, apparel, food, remedy, tools, and cooking utensils to housing, constructing materials, seeds, and animals.

Two aspects have to be kept in thoughts while identifying the content material of the packages. It is imperative that the contents are standardised in some way. Failure to do so can also lead to tensions and violence by means of disgruntled war veterans (Strategic: 2004:17). There should on the same time be sufficient flexibility to permit for the contents to differ depending at the region of reintegration whether or not it's miles into a city or rural surroundings (Colletta, 2004:174-75). After the immediately survival of struggle veterans is ensured, it's far essential to find approaches to present them the abilities, information, and records that permits them to assist themselves in a sustainable way. Most demobilised veterans lack sufficient schooling and skills to compete at the labour marketplace. Assistance can therefore accept to war veterans wishing to finish their number one or secondary training. In a few situations, support can also take delivery of two individuals seeking a better training.

Any formal schooling has to be preceded by means of a market observe, assessing whether such schooling will make contributions to employment. It is likewise sensible to make an assessment of the incentive and capacities of the warfare veteran in question (Liberian 2003:55; & WB, 2001:56). Access to training and training is in particular crucial in nations with advanced economies, in which the discrepancy among the abilities that battle veterans possess and the abilities that are in demand at the labour marketplace is the greatest (Spear, 2002:155). Even though formal schooling can at instances be motivated, additionally it is extra fruitful to provide get entry to more practical, palms-on education. Such skills are more beneficial



within the casual region where maximum battle veterans come to be. Vocational training has historically been visible as the high-quality way for struggle veterans to accumulate abilities in regions including plumbing, masonry, carpentry, electric paintings, and small-scale cottage industry.

Vocational education programmes have, however, had meagre outcomes in many nations. In El Salvador, handiest a predicted 25% of folks that received vocational training without a doubt determined employment of their area of specialty. More and greater practitioners are as an alternative arguing that apprenticeships and on-the-process education are most desirable, due to the fact that it's miles easier for folks that lack education to acquire abilities (Strategic 2004:28). In Angola apprenticeships had been extra powerful than vocational education, due to the fact competencies and earnings had been acquired extra fast (Verhey, 2002:4). Apprenticeships and on-the-job education have an extra gain. They supply war veteran's contacts and a precious reference that can be used when in search of new employment. They also permit war veterans to boom their networking competencies. Whether education is vocational or done through apprenticeships, it should be based on right labour market research and be demand pushed. Such research has often been missing in lots of reintegration efforts subsidized via donors (Nübler, 2004:65).

In nations in which this has been possible, such as Namibia and Zimbabwe, huge numbers of battle veterans were rewarded with public posts. In both Namibia and Zimbabwe this has, however, brought about different troubles which include outsized budgets and decreased efficiency (Disarmament..., 2004:71). A more appropriate method is for country wide governments to hire demobilised veterans in production or the rehabilitation of infrastructure (Nübler, 2000:59). With the advent of peace, homes and infrastructure need to be rebuilt and repaired, which creates a big demand for unqualified labour. Being unskilled and having low or no education, makes war veterans a suitable organization to recruit from (UN, 2001:54). Since reconstruction booms are brief in nature, it's far critical to look employment in production and the rehabilitation of infrastructure as a temporary solution (Colletta, 2004:176).

### **Contextual Factors that Make Reintegration More Difficult**

There are 4 contextual factors that make it tempting for war veterans to re-engage in violence: the life of armed organizations, get right of entry to to herbal resources which might be smooth to loot, a high availability of weapons, and insufficient control by means of the significant governments over their own territory. When making plans reintegration help, donors and practitioners have to be conscious that reintegration will be extra difficult in environments in which these factors exist.

### **Armed Groups**

Demobilised veterans have navy competencies which can be in excessive call for by armed factions which have not demobilised. It regularly happens that war veterans are recruited, both voluntarily and forcibly, by using spoilers or businesses fighting wars in different international locations. Starting a rebellion is a highly-priced and complex affair. For a guerrilla institution to live on it must have a positive size. This size obviously varies, however empirical evidence shows that it generally includes at least 500 individuals (Collier, 2000:842). For disgruntled warfare veterans it may therefore be a lot less difficult to enroll in agencies which can be already in life than to recreate new ones. One example is of former Tuareg rebels from Mali. Demobilised in 1996, several had been paid by way of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), an Islamism guerrilla institution fighting the Algerian regime, to sign up for them. (Altervision, May 5, 2004). At times, former veterans are also forced to join armed companies. In Uganda, demobilised government soldiers in the northern part of the U.S.A. Had been compelled into joining rebellion companies, consisting of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) (Kingma, 2000c:239).

### **Spoils**

It is likewise potential that the life of primary commodity exports, so-called spoils, will increase the probability of struggle veterans conducting violence, specifically if the products are situated in areas missing authorities manipulate. Some authors argue that the main incentive for insurrection is the opportunity for non-public enrichment. They argue that guerrilla agencies appear in international locations which can be depending on the export of certain herbal resources, which include diamonds, wood and drugs. By illegally taxing the alternate of such commodities, guerrilla companies can increase themselves. Even in armed conflicts pushed fundamental through grievances, the prey on number one commodities might also end up an vital means of sustaining the rebellion (Collier, 2000). With revel in in looting and unlawful taxation, battle veterans might also hotel to fingers to enrich themselves if the extraction and export of herbal resources aren't properly covered. In the Republic of Congo, as an example, former Ninja rebels had been concerned in the plunder of trains carrying cement, oil and petroleum (IRIN, Oct. Eleven, 2004).

### **Lack of Disarmament**

A 0.33 tempting issue is whether or not there are huge numbers of hands in stream after a peace agreement. If that is the case, it is able to be simpler for struggle veterans to resort to violence and banditry. This seems to be especially actual if there may be a high charge of unemployment amongst former veterans (Call & Stanley, 2003:216; Gamba, 2003:126; & Spencer, 1997:62-63).

### **Security Vacuum**

The final factor issues whether governments have managed over their personal territories. If the state fails to assure the safety of its citizens and their belongings, violent marketers may additionally have interaction in plundering. Such entrepreneurs may be anything from guerrilla organizations and mercenaries to private security firms and crook organizations. (Mehlum, 2003: 508). The want to expand governmental manipulate with the advent of peace is also underlined by means of the truth that rebel corporations often need sanctuaries, wherein they are able to retreat from governmental forces, so that it will survive. These sanctuaries have a tendency to be remote territories with low population densities or neighbouring nations (Gates, 2002: 126). It isn't any accident that battle veterans have engaged in both armed banditry and political violence in large, sparsely populated countries like Mali and Niger, both of which lack robust countrywide armies (African Research Bulletin, Nov. 2000:14204). It is consequently controversial that war veterans are more prone to have interaction in special types of violence if there are areas in which they are able to function outside the state.

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

This study was conducted from a qualitative, interpretive research paradigm (Gerring, 2007). This is a paradigm that, among other things, seeks subjective views of individuals' war veterans (Sapsford, 2007). The first selection criterion was voluntary participation. Of the eligible candidates, the researcher eliminated members of my immediate executive with whom the researcher interacted with daily and with whom personal relationships had developed an reduced the pool of eligible candidates to ten.

The researcher used purposive sampling to recruit participants. The researcher chose to work with war veterans rather than traditional leaders since the researcher was in the war of liberation for 5 years. The researcher believed working with the war veterans' community to answer the research question offers several advantages. The second criterion for selection was membership in the association led by the researcher during my tenure as Secretary General. The shared experiences provide a common backdrop and, to some extent, normalize each individual's reintegration process. Each person experienced the same major events, yet interpreted them differently, making their own meanings in different ways over time.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with war veterans in Mutare. These were face-to-face interviews. Shingleton & Straight (2014), suggest that an interview is a conversation between the interviewer and the interviewee with the specific purpose of obtaining relevant information. The researcher aimed to concentrate on topical issues and not specific questions, hence the utilisation of semi-structured interviews. The researcher used a tape recorder with the concert of the

participants so as to capture the exact words from the participants' mouth and also used probes when interviewing to find out secret or hidden information on the issue of reintegration of war veterans and the challenges thereof.

### **FINDINGS**

The aim of the study was to assess the practical work with the economic security of war veterans, to determine how veterans are viewed as a weak and marginalised group and to analyse practical work with the physical security of war veterans. To recall, when warring parties are demobilised and ex-combatants are released into civilian life, society is faced with three main challenges: a) ex-combatants often pose a threat to post-war security, b) the atrocities that ex-combatants may have committed can create conflict-generating rifts and c) certain groups of weak and marginalised ex-combatants may need special assistance for humanitarian reasons. If these challenges especially the security threat that former combatants pose are not taken seriously, ex-combatants may re-engage in violence and render post-war reconstruction and peace building impossible. To deal with these challenges, donors have developed so-called reintegration programmes. However, even if there has been a growing interest amongst donors and academics in the past 15 years in how to facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants, the exact meaning of the concept reintegration is still vague. Based on an inventory of different definitions, this study argues that reintegration should be seen as a societal process aiming at the economic, political, and social assimilation of ex-combatants and their families into civil society. The main advantage of this definition is that it includes the political assimilation of ex-combatants, something which is missing in many current definitions. Reintegration is a highly political process. Failing to realise this may result in certain categories or groups of ex-combatants being discriminated against, creating severe tensions in the post-conflict period. Furthermore, if ex-combatants cannot influence decisions affecting them, they may have incentives to reengage in violence. The research dealing with the reintegration of former combatants is still underdeveloped. There are, at present, no theories that explain under which circumstances reintegration tends to be successful. Instead, there are statements and assumptions about what is believed to hinder ex-combatants from re-engaging in different sorts of violence. Even though these statements are not founded on scientific research, they are of interest because they are based on actual experiences of trying to reintegrate ex-combatants. These assumptions all revolve around three central themes: a) the need to find peacetime substitutes for the benefits of war, b) the need to heal the wounds of war, and c) the need to deal with contextual factors that make reintegration more difficult.

### **Recommendations**

Based on our sensible and albeit limited theoretical understanding, more concrete guidelines had

been made for how donors can guide one of a kind reintegration technique in submit-warfare societies. In the subsequent, the maximum crucial of those guidelines are presented:

- When have to reintegration help accepts? Targeted support to ex-warring parties is best warranted if a) they represent a security risk to the new peace order, b) the atrocities that they'll have devoted can create war-generating rifts in society, or c) sure categories of ex-warring parties can't support themselves due to monetary, political, or social marginalization. This is often the case for female ex-fighters and toddler infantrymen.
- When ought to reintegration assistance now not take delivery of? The giving of help have to be prevented while a) there's no peace agreement fixing or regulating the incompatibility of the combatants, b) there is no political will a few of the belligerents to abide by using the peace accord, or c) there may be a endured excessive level of violence, despite the signing of a peace settlement, wherein opponents may also worry for their safety as they end up civilians.
- Finding substitutes for the blessings of battle. There are four regions wherein development co-operation must find peacetime substitutes for the advantages of battle. First, as opponents become civilians, their bodily protection must be ensured. Second, there should be legal economic possibilities for demobilised opponents with the intention to support themselves and their families. Third, ex-combatants ought to be able to persuade decisions affecting them, and fourth, it's far critical to make certain that ex-combatant do not lose the societal prestige they won in the course of the war. Of these 4, the first three are the most relevant to address, as it can be tough to safeguard the status of ex-combatant without making reconciliation greater hard.
- Ensuring the monetary protection of ex-combatant. Most ex-combatant turn out to be in the casual region. Former fighters may additionally consequently need fundamental knowledge of marketplace structures, accounting, and management and access to credit schemes and apprenticeships or on-the-process education. Apprenticeships and on-the-task education have verified more powerful than vocational education and have to consequently be prioritised. Creating employment opportunities in production or the rehabilitation of infrastructure is also advocated

## REFERENCES

1. Abdullah, I. (2002). "Youth Culture and Rebellion: Understanding Sierra Leone's Wasted Decade". *A Journal of South-North Cultural and Media Studies*, 16(2), 19-37.
2. Alden, C (2002). "Making Old Soldiers Fade Away: Lessons from the Reintegration of Demobilized

- Soldiers in Mozambique". *Security Dialogue*, 33(1), 341-356.
3. Bendana, A. (1997). "Demobilized Soldiers as Peace-Builders". *Security Dialogue*, 28(2), 249-264.
4. Berdal, Mats, B. R. (1996). *Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars*. *Adelphi Paper*, 303.
5. Colletta, N. J. (2004). "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. Lessons and Liabilities in Reconstruction". In Robert I. Rotberg (Ed.), *When States Fail. Causes and Consequences*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
6. Collier, P. (1994). "Demobilization and Insecurity: A Study in the Economics of the Transition from War to Peace". *Journal of International Development*, 6 (3), 343-351.
7. Dikongue-Atangana, A. (2004). *Senior Regional Legal Advisor*. Bureau for Africa, UNHCR, Geneva, Interview November.
8. "Disarmament and Reintegration in Afghanistan" (2003). *International Crisis Group*. Asia Report No 65, 30 September.
9. Gleichmann, C., Odenwald, M., Steenken, K., & Wilkinson, A. (2004). *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: A practical field and classroom guide*.
10. Gamba, V. (2003). *Managing violence: Disarmament and demobilization*. In *Contemporary Peacemaking* (pp. 125-136). Palgrave Macmillan, London.
11. Roger Mac G (2006). *Contemporary Peacemaking. Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes*. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
12. Hitchcock, N. (2004). *Disarmament, demobilisation & reintegration: the case of Angola*. *Conflict Trends*, 2004(1), 36-40.
13. Kingma, K. (2016). *Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Development and Security Impacts*. Springer.
14. Secretariat, D. I. (2003). *Liberian Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programme—Strategy and Implementation Framework*. *National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration*, 16.
15. Charlotte, L. (2001). *Women facing war*. *Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)*.
16. Lundin, I. B. (1998). *Mechanisms of community reception of demobilised soldiers in Mozambique*. *African Journal of Political Science/Revue Africaine de Science Politique*, 104-118.
17. Lyons, T. (2004). "Transforming the Institutes of War. Post-Conflict Elections and the Reconstruction of Failed States". In Robert I. Rotberg (Ed.), *When States Fail. Causes and Consequences*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
18. Martinez, L. (2000). *The Algerian Civil War 1990-1998*. London: Hurst & Company.

18. Maynard, KA. (1997), "Rebuilding Community: Psychosocial Healing, Reintegration, and Reconciliation at the Grassroots Level". In K. Kumar (Ed.), *Rebuilding Societies after Civil War. Critical Roles for International Assistance*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
19. Mehlum, H., & Ragnar, P. (2002). "Plunder & Protection Inc.". *Journal of Peace Research*, 39(4), 447-459.
20. Mueller, J. (2003). "Policing the Remnants of War". *Journal of Peace Research*, 40(5), 507-518.
21. Nübler, I, (2000)," Human Resources Development and Utilization in Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes". In K. Kingma (Ed.), *Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Development and Security*
22. OECD, (2004). *Security System Reform and Governance. Policy and Practice. A DAC Reference Document*. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development.
23. Barth, E. (2002). Peace as Disappointment: The Reintegration of Female Soldiers in Post Conflict Societies. A Comparative Study from Africa, PRIO Report 3/2002. *International Peace Research Institute, Oslo*.
24. Peteet, J (2002). "Male Gender and Rituals of Resistance in the Palestinian Intifada: A Cultural Politics of Violence". In C. Besteman (Ed.), *Violence. A Reader*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
25. Preston, R (1997). "Integrating Fighters after War: Reflections on the Namibian Experience, 1989-1993". *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 23(3), 453-472.
26. Regional Surveys of the World. The Far East and Australia 2005. (2004). London and New York: Europa Publications.
27. Sawyer, A. (2004). "Violent Conflicts and Governance Challenges in West Africa: The Case of the Mano River Basin Area". *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 42(3), 437-463.
28. Schafer, J. (1998). A Baby Who Does Not Cry Will Not Be Suckled: AMODEG and the Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers". *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 24(1), 207-222.
29. Schafer, J. (2001). "Guerillas and Violence in the War in Mozambique: *African Affairs*.
30. Snyder, J. (1999), "Civil War and the Security Dilemma". In B. F. Walter and J. Snyder (Eds.), *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention*. New York: Columbia University Press.
31. Spear, J. (2002). "Disarmament and Demobilization". In S. J. Stedman, D. Rothchild and E. M. Cousens (Eds.), *Ending Civil Wars. The Implementation of Peace Agreements*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
32. Spencer, D. (1997). *Demobilization and reintegration in Central America* (Vol. 8). BICC.
33. Stedman, S. J. (1997). Spoiler problems in peace processes. *International security*, 22(2), 5-53.
34. Stedman, Stephen John (2003). "Peace Processes and the Challenges of Violence". In J. Darby and Ro. Mac Ginty (eds.), *Contemporary Peacemaking. Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes*. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
35. UN, (1999). *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment. Principles and Guidelines*. New York: Lessons Learned Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations.
36. Verhey, B. (2001). Child soldiers: prevention, demobilization and reintegration.
37. Wallensteen, P (2002). *Understanding Conflict Resolution. War, Peace and the Global System*. London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: SAGE Publications.
38. Walter, B. F., Snyder, J. L., & Snyder, J. (Eds.). (1999). *Civil wars, insecurity, and intervention*. Columbia University Press.
39. World Bank. (2001). *Demobilization and Reintegration Programming*. World Bank.
40. Weinstein, J. (2002). "The Structure of Rebel Organizations. Implications for the Post-Conflict Reconstruction". *Dissemination Notes: (4): Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit*. World Bank.
41. Weinstein, J. (2004, November). Resources and the information problem in rebel recruitment. In *conference on curbing human rights violations by non-state armed groups. Centre of International Relations, Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, 14e15 November*.
42. Zartman, W. (1995). "Conclusions: The Last Mile". In William I. Zartman (Ed.), *Elusive Peace. Negotiating an End to Civil War*. Washington D.C.: Brookings.