



Research Article

Volume-04|Issue-02|2023

An Examination of the Drivers in Zimbabwe's Military Intervention in the Mozambican Civil War From 1975-1992Tatenda Yvonne Mupasu*¹, & Jonah Marawako¹¹Department of Governance and Public Management, Midlands State University, Zimbabwe**Article History**

Received: 29.01.2022

Accepted: 15.02.2023

Published: 18.02.2023

Citation

Mupasu, T. Y., & Marawako, J. (2023). An Examination of the Drivers in Zimbabwe's Military Intervention in the Mozambican Civil War From 1975-1992. *Indiana Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, 4(2), 1-12.

Abstract: In 1980-2017 Zimbabwe intervened in the conflict in Mozambique after being invited by the government of FRELIMO. Any country's intervention is driven by its national interest. Military intervention is considered as the last resort after the failure of other methods such as diplomacy, alliance action and policing. It is therefore the purpose of this research to analyze the rationale behind Zimbabwe's military intervention in the Mozambican civil war. The major drivers points to national identity and Raison de Etat (National Interest) are useful explanatory tools in the military intervention in the Mozambican Civil War and how this intervention is complementary to the achievement of the bilateral relations goals and self-gains of military, political, social or economic, its quest is to necessitate benefit between the parties involved. The article argues that the intervention is because of shared values and ethics whose intended result is based on necessitating political, social, economic and military security in these countries. The foreign policy is perceived to be born out of the domestic shared values of national identity and include sovereignty, anti-imperialism, economic growth, revolutionary experience and national interest which all have necessitated mutual cooperation and impeded the war from damaging most parts of the region. The intervention saved a day in Mozambique.

Keywords: Military Intervention, Civil War, FRELIMO, National Interests, Bilateral Relations, Foreign Policy.

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INTRODUCTION

The aim of this article is to identify, analyze, evaluate and ascertain the primary motivating factors that guided the intervention of Zimbabwe in Mozambique civil war. In simpler terms, the article thrives to pervade a logical basis of reasons for the intervention of Zimbabwe government in Mozambican civil war and the casual factors of Zimbabwe engagement in the conflict will be explored so as to give a synthesized grounded understanding of the intervention and this would aid in understanding the dynamics in the conflict. The article is divided into two sections the first section being a discussion of the working definitions having established military intervention to be based on political, economic and humanitarian cause it then shapes the second section that adequately explores the real reason of taking on the decision of military intervention, disregarding other conflict resolution strategies.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO BILATERAL INTERVENTIONS

Diplomatic cooperation amidst conflict has been widely addressed phenomenon by historians, scholars and political scientists who thrive to present a framework that attracts such cooperation and coexistence proto cooperation theorists have laid a foundation that cements the notion of cooperation during civil conflicts like in Mozambique is not a new phenomenon but a relieved experience that has

characterized global politics and even stretching back to the medieval era. A succession of scholars reaching from Plato, Hobbes, Kropotkin, Maynard Smith and African philosophy line of thinking has given a map which lays out the ability to generate corporation in a competitive world. Group cooperation and coordination is highlighted as a crucial element that guides the relations that exists between bilateral entities.

The renowned well celebrated intellectuals have founded a framework of understanding of the complex role. That bilateral cooperation play in the quest of development and maintaining shared and mutual interests and this has been clearly shared and mutual interests and this has been clearly espoused in the Zimbabwe/ Mozambique relation which has seen even the two cooperating during conflict times. Civil conflict across the world and Africa, have a negative ripple Influence on the development of the affected nations and all those surrounding. The civil war in Mozambique was disastrous to all the surrounding since the RENAMO did not merely target FRELIMO force but to infrastructure to which the neighboring Zimbabwe based its networking and economic development, thus, it was not merely a war in Mozambique, but also attack on its bilateral ally and the whole of SADC. It is worth giving a snapshot of the historical perspective so as to glean the sufficient understanding of trends in relations.

Mozambique obtained its independence in 1975 after a prolonged subjugate administration of the Portuguese through a liberation struggle, however this

well celebrated feeling of liberation and peace did not exist for long as 1997 worked the inception of civil war instigated by the Rhodesian and Apartheid funded Resistanca Nacional de Mocambique (RENAMO), RENAMO led by Andre Matsangaise was a political movement created by the Rhodesian Smith Regime and then the Apartheid government to starve the nationalist relations of the revolutionary movements in Zimbabwe and South Africa. It can be held that the Mozambican independence gave hope of the revolution prowess of the black movements that the imperialists devised civil insurgences to disturb the drive of decolonization through spearheading the formation of the RENAMO which compromised Zimbabwe and ANC mobilization which was a direct attack to the bilateral relations. Its main aim was emerged to be to dismantle and counter FRELIMO proliferation in the country and a hindrance to the bilateral relations of Zimbabwe and Mozambique which was crucial for decolonization, economic development and the achievement of national interests in the respective states.

RENAMO had support of the west and the FRELIMO had support of the Soviet Union and the Communist parties. These clashes of the powerful had a ripple effect on the surrounding states, hence it led to the intervention of Zimbabwe's military considering its armed struggle relations with Mozambique scholarly publications have revealed that the war intensified in 1980 and thus saw the increase in political tension, economic recession and lack of social services. Civilians were attacked and the ZANLA military bases were attacked by the RENAMO and this had a ripple effect on the revolutionary movement of Zimbabwe.

Complemented by its foreign policy that thrived to ward off imperialism and apartheid which was necessitated by its position as the only potential state in Southern Africa Zimbabwe's military intervened in the Mozambique civil war because of various reasons which this article will highlight. The military interventions show the bilateral coordination that exist between the two which goes beyond any grievous event. This article argues that Zimbabwe's involvement at the height of the war in 1980 was because of national interest perpetuated through the political, economic and social ties that exist between Zimbabwe and Mozambique event to this present date during this time the Mugabe regime thrived to effect economic power and this was possible through access to the Beira corridor. Zimbabwe as a landlocked country needed a safe passage to the Indian Ocean which was Zimbabwe's lifelines it could import vital commodities like fuel and a channel of export since South Africa was shackled by United Nations (UN) sanction.

The shared nationalistic perspective had a role in the intervention which saved the day in Mozambique. The RENAMO was labelled an Imperialist and Apartheid outfit that was aimed at reversing the strides

of anti-imperialism and decolonization that had swept the whole region except SA if Mozambique was seized by RENAMO the next possible apartheid regime could have been Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe's zeal as espoused in its foreign policy aimed to dismantle imperialism and foster sovereignty. The military interventions are guided by the ethos guiding the domestic politics and have instead extended into the foreign politics. From the laid-out trends in events relation to the relations of Mozambique and Zimbabwe, it is justified that the relationship is based on interest, mutually interdependent and intervention being a key sign and move of protecting the economic, social, political and military interest of the two. Economically the trading partners have realized tangible fruits for the interdependence. Both countries have realized benefits from the bilateral relations and this has been of great importance to the region since civil conflict is retrogressive even to the surrounding neighbors. It is against this background that the article thrives to highlight how the role of military intervention has been a critical element in the realization of mutual benefits and a hub to the relations of the two. This background will also help in discovering the stances of the two countries in necessitating the wave of socialism in the region as the bilateral relations has had an effect in the diminishing of Apartheid.

Zimbabwe's military intervention in Mozambique has received a myriad of bad publicity from different quarters one of the unfair criticisms has been that the intervention was uncalled for and that Zimbabwe carried it out for selfish reasons. The other criticism has been that the effects or result or results of the intervention were negative for both Zimbabwe and Mozambique. The third accusation has been that the intervention has frosted relations between the two countries. This article aims to investigate the substance in the criticism with a few to build bridges between the two countries in the post conflict period.

It is in section two that the possible casual factors to taking on the decision of military intervention are explored. These are stratified into political, economic and humanitarian factors that may have shaped the decision. However, the legitimacy of the intervention is closely linked to the portrayed correlated between Zimbabwe and the origins of the RENAMO insurgent group. Some of the scholarly propositions relate the relationship and intervention to be the cause of the interconnectedness.

In order to have a synthesized understanding of the rationale behind Zimbabwe intervention in this conflict it is essential to explain Zimbabwe's link to the genesis of RENAMO. In an interview with Adnito Maure a Minister-Counsellor from Mozambique assured that the Roman gecup was the brainchild of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization which was under Ken Flower and its quest was to disturb the

activation of FRELIMO and its support to the Zimbabwean nationalists. It also meant to sabotage and spy on ZANLA which was given homage in Mozambique and espionage work against ZANLA, a Zimbabwean nationalist military wing. With the fall of the military imperialist's regime in Zimbabwe, RENAMO came under South Africa control. It proved to be a strategy to destabilize the countries in the region and at the same time thwart Black Nationalism sentiments and fortify values of apartheid with Zimbabwe fully as a target of this monster. This is of relevance to this section as it justifies that the intervention through whatever means was inevitable because of the interconnections between the interested parties in the conflict.

Definition Debate of Military Intervention

The definition and meaning of military intervention is only derived from various contexts in which intervention takes place, actions involved, the actors, objectives and the aims of the action itself. Vincent (1974) defines military intervention as an activity undertaken by a state, a group within a state, a group of states or an international organization which interferes coercively in the domestic affairs of another state. It is a discrete event having a beginning and an end, and it is aimed at the authority structure of the target state. It is not necessarily lawful or unlawful, but it does break a conventional pattern of international relation. In this context and according to the definition presented by Vincent (1974), military intervention is politics based with the intention aimed at the authority structure of the state and without merely with the laid-out structure in Article of the UN Charter. This can be contextualized with the 1990 Rwanda genocide where it was subjected to Uganda intervention and also the DRC war that saw about eight countries intervening without a UNSC mandate.

This thinking of military intervention is held by Pearson and Baumann, in their studies of five continents, define military intervention operationally as:

The movement of regular troops or forces (airborne, seaborne, shelling, etc) of one country into the territory or territorial waters of another country, or forceful military action by troops already stationed by one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute.

However, these definitions of military intervention limits it to those actions undertaken by a given state without the consent of a target state and targeted on the political authority. Those coercive actions directly affect the internal political, economic and military structures of the targeted state (Vincent 1974). According to their definitions, in military interventions the intervening state or states sets aside the existing relations with the target state and put all its efforts towards changing the political structure and

authority of that target state and sometimes to preserve the existing political structure and authority of the target. However, Vincent definition seems to be premised on realism and presentation of politics to be "the struggle for power". It ignores the idealistic principles of international politics that premise on global peaceful coexistence without interference in internal affairs. Thus, employing this in this research would stifle the research objective as it has a subjective presentation of the intention of military interventions.

Another form of intervention involves a demonstration or show of force aimed at making another state change its policies. An example of this was the military display demonstrated by South African forces near the borders of both South Africa and Lesotho in 1994, which successfully reversed the Palace coup in Lesotho. This form of diplomacy coerced the King of Lesotho into reinstating the democratically elected government.

Related to the above type of intervention is military intervention in intrastate conflicts. This form of intervention involves "the sending of large quantities of troops either to stabilize a regime against rebels or to help overthrow an established set of authorities. More often, the intervention is the result of a crisis; troops are sent in rapidly, often catching the regime or rebels by surprise". This was also the case in point with the combined Angolan, Rwandan and Ugandan intervention in the DRC in 1997 and in 1998, together with countries such as Burundi, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Chad.

Vertzberger argues that military intervention should be conceptualized in three different ways. He defines it by submitting that "the term intervention means coercive military intrusion into the internal or foreign affairs of another state". Secondly, he opinions that conceptually defined, foreign military intervention means:

State organized and state controlled, goal orientated military coercion by one foreign state in the territory of another. The activities are directed at its political structures with the purpose of preserving or changing that structure thereby influencing its domestic political process or certain of its foreign policies.

Thirdly, he argues that "operationally defined, foreign military intervention involves the direct, covert commitment of uniformed, combat-ready units and formations to conduct conventional operations in a foreign state". All the interventions under study here were organized and the outcomes were controlled by the intervening countries. In Rwanda in 1990, Uganda changed the political structure. Similarly, in 1996-97, the Mobutu regime in DRC was removed from power by foreign military intervention and in Lesotho the intervener ousted the prevailing regime.

The above propositions present a valuable explanation of what is meant by external military intervention and domestic disputes in a clear conceptual scheme. It provides a useful and relevant discussion that guides this research and aids in achieving the research objectives.

Military intervention as highlighted in the above paragraphs is categorized to be actions taken by states or group of states with or without the approval of international organizations such as the UN Security Council, regional organizations such as the AU and sub-regional organizations like SADC. Overallly the concept of intervention is aimed at changing the internal political, economic, military, and social structures of the target state with or without the consent of the target states. These interventions whether unilateral or multilateral, they are guided by the values of restoring democracy and peace. Thus, whilst there may be no agreed definition of intervention, there are broad conceptual issues that need to be taken note as reference points. According to Schwarz (1970) these include power, self-interest, international law and morality. These often shape the intervention motives and discernible in the country's foreign relations and these in relation to this article, shaped the bilateral relations between Zimbabwe and Mozambique.

Military Strategy Used in the Mozambican Civil War

The Zimbabwe Defense Forces strategy used both defensive and offensive fighting doctrines shaped by a low intensity operational framework. According to Moyo (2007) the strategy had to be shaped in such a way that it responded timely and appropriately to the challenges of low intensity operations. Low intensity operations are all military activities taken against insurgent elements short limited of war the operations differ by their nature significantly from conventional warfare and therefore in order to meet strategic challenges a lot of tactical innovations were developed in the process. Thus, the military intervention in Mozambique by Zimbabwe involved low intensity operations for a period of 10years RENAMO was an insurgent organization that sought to overthrow the government of Samora Machel prompting Zimbabwe's military intervention. According to Mlambo Zimbabwe's military had operational code names which included Operation Grapefruit for Beira Corridor, Operation Cobweb for the Tete Corridor and Operation Open Way for the Limpopo Corridor. These were the defensive operations that were meant to protect the three corridors from the RENAMO attacks. The offensive strategy which was used was that of capturing Casa Banana one of the strongest RENAMO bases in 1985.

The Drivers

Through a combination of persuasive and brutal tactics, RENAMO, gained ground in Mozambican countryside and confined government forces to major towns and cities. Turner (1998) asserts that Its operations intensified at an alarming rate such that in mid-June 1981 heavy fighting was reported along Mozambique-Zimbabwe border in the vicinity of Espungabera where over 3000 RENAMO insurgents were believed to have taken part in battle. According to Dr Mutambudzi, the refugees fled from Mozambique to Zimbabwe to seek shelter and refuge since Mozambique was no longer a safe place for civilians, Hence this posed a serious threat to Zimbabwe since refugees fled into Zimbabwe and among them, they were RENAMO intelligence therefore it was a security threat to Zimbabwe among other reasons.

Hathaway (2005) postulates that in one of the ironic twists of South African politics, Zimbabwe became a target of the RENAMO, a monster created by its predecessor Rhodesian white government. This insurgent attack was the refuge problem. There were mass killings and displacement of people during the civil war hence some fled into Zimbabwe to seek refuge however this was now a threat not only civilians fled into Zimbabwe but rather other RENAMO rebels also fled into Zimbabwe to destabilize as well as recruiting and raiding other people to be part of the RENAMO group. The gravity of the insurgent attacks in Mozambique dawned on Zimbabwe when the number of refugees which into the country became too difficult to manage. The vicissitudes of colonial boundary system made it relatively simple for the refugees to easily cross and settle in Zimbabwe. This was a time bomb that laid pressure on Zimbabwe's available resources and drained this county's resources.

According to Chinyan'anya (2018) the Beira corridor and Maputo ports was of importance to Zimbabwe since Zimbabwe was a landlocked country hence these were the only routes for Zimbabwe to access goods through the sea and RENAMO'S attacks on Mozambican Economic targets were an effect to Zimbabwe's economic gains. Since 1982, RENAMO targeted and destroyed all the major economic links between Mozambique and land locked Zimbabwe. The mostly affected was the Beira and Maputo ports which led to Zimbabwean border town of Mutare and those served as the fulcrum of the Zimbabwean economy such pipes of the precious mineral oil to Zimbabwe originated in Beira. During the night of 10/11 October 1982 RENAMO attacked and destroyed Marfoga Oil Pumping station in Mozambique. Moyo (2007) assures that this had serious negative implications to Zimbabwe. According to Major General Mugoba (2018), Oil supplies to Zimbabwe were disrupted at a time when the country was seeking to avoid reliance on Apartheid South Africa trade routes. Mandizha (2011)

postulates that, in the post 1980, Zimbabwe became the 'African Jewel' with the Beira Corridor being its lifeline to the sea through which it could import vital commodities like fuel which were crucial for industrial development. Its intervention is justified as a means of protecting its economic prowess in the region and a favorable integration which was crucial for its economic growth. RENAMO's attack on the ports resulted in enormous loss of fuel by Zimbabwe, thus the protection of this precious channel was a major reason of the ZNA's involvement in Mozambique with an aim of putting a hold to the threats. The then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe made it clear in his statement that, "Whatever it costs as to safeguard those is money spent well. If these routes cease to function the alternative is for us to divert our goods through South Africa the alternative we cannot countenance and so we are committed to guard and protect these routes."

Also economic consequences of RENAMO attacks on Zimbabwe were on those who operated along the Border with Mozambique who were forced to abandon their farmlands in search of safety. This consequently damaged – production capacity, thus nailing further damage on the economy. According to Chipaziwa (2018), the attacks also jeopardized the national parks in Zimbabwe which were along the borders and those closed down for security reasons. Consequently, these RENAMO attacks also had an impact on Zimbabwe's foreign policy agenda of maintaining its economic prowess in Southern Africa and limit on eliminate its dependency on South Africa and this was only possible by maintaining clear passage in Mozambique which accounted for 53% of Zimbabwe's transportation. Alao (2015) suggests that by 1987, Zimbabwe's direct traffic to Mozambique had reduced to 8, 7% as a result of the heinous activities of the RENAMO rebels. Zimbabwe's freight costs through Durban compromised and siphoned Z\$100 million which could have been saved. Scholars who support military intervention in protecting economic interests have propounded some arguments that truly cement the Zimbabwean Mozambique civil war scenario.

Richmond (2013) asserts that military interventions are masked economic ambitions. These cynic scholars believe that economic motives underline every foreign intervention.

A train bound for Zimbabwe along the Limpopo railway line detonated a landmine at Chicuala and derailed, both the train and goods bound for Zimbabwe were extensively damaged following these developments particularly those of Marfoga and increased threats to Beira corridor hence need for intervention. The fact that national economic interests determined the Zimbabwe government's decision for Intervention justifies the means of force being employed as a strategy to promote and safeguard these interests. Zimbabwe had made substantial direct

investment in trade and commerce, mining, electricity, railway, road and air transport prior to the intervention and from a realistic point of view this was worth defending through whatever means. The outbreak of these civil atrocities of the war threatened these growing relations, investments and, above all, it endangered the lives of a substantial number of Zimbabweans (civilians and business people) thus, the conflict directly attacked the Zimbabwe investment opportunities in Mozambique thus these were worth protecting through whatever means.

Moreover, Zimbabwe had and still has pertinent grounds to regard a peaceful Mozambique, with its lustrous large population, a crucial alternative market for the Zimbabwean industry and source of labor. The research unearthed that there was free flow of labor with the manpower from Mozambique being essential for the industrial growth. Industrialists have revealed that the immigrants from Mozambique were preferable employees for a minimum wage and worked hard in Zimbabwean industries and drivers in the key economic sectors. A hostile change of regime would have struck these investment opportunities. With these factors in mind, for the Zimbabwean government, committing troops to support the FRELIMO regime would work in its favors in as far as Zimbabwe's strategic economic interests in industrial market expansion and maintenance of a good labor source.

Alaond notes that the Feruka Pipeline agreement was also a critical pathway for the supply of fuel in Zimbabwe. Institutional researches have revealed that this high value mineral was essential for Zimbabwean economic growth with the Mozambique ports of Beira and Maputo summing to 80% of the fuel supplies in Zimbabwe. These ports were the hub of Zimbabwe's economic activities and access of a wider market spectrum. Chinyan'anya (2018) postulates that Zimbabwe with its landlocked nature needed Mozambique to access the Indian Ocean. The essential nature of these ports to the economic growth of both countries nurtured the need to harness and defend these economic links as a potential solution. Thus, the national economic interests also played a part in the Zimbabwe government's decision to deploy troops in defense of the Maputo FRELIMO government to protect its economic security interests.

However, the notion of economic interests being critical to Zimbabwe decision for intervention has been sometimes been argued to be idealistic and secondary, with personal interest being a primary driving force in most instances. The counter arguments to economic interests in military intervention in Mozambique have argued that personal interests take center stage in all international politics decisions. There have been allegations that the decision by Zimbabwe to intervene in the Mozambique civil war was first and foremost done to prop up Samora Machel of personal

friendship that existed between the two leaders and exacerbated by their shared colonial and liberation war struggle history. In the case of this military intervention it instead became a catalyst to economic challenges that time with some of the public labeling it 'wasteful and cumbersome' thus, decision for military intervention as had nothing to do with safeguarding of the country's economic interests, but rather, it was a decision that was motivated by personal elite interests and shaped by the leaders personal interactions and relationship. In this light the motive to protect economic security may have been the driving force to deciding on military intervention but this has sometimes been compromised by personal interests.

Consequently, innocent attacks on Zimbabwean civilians coerced Zimbabwe to engage itself in the civil conflict statistics and predecessors researches reveals that the insurgent group launched attacks on individual Zimbabweans. This was associated with cases of looting to obtain commodities, kidnapping for purposes of forced labor. These attacks were rampant in areas bordering Mozambique and Zimbabwe like Chipinge, Mount Darwin, Chiredzi, Chimanimani and Mudzi. This was a direct attack that called humanitarian intervention which Zimbabwe took military intervention since the rebel activities were a threat to civilians, population which is one of the components that defines a state. It was indeed a justified cause for Zimbabwe to intervene in protection of its security which was in various ways compromised by RENAMO's insurgent attacks.

Military Intervention as a way to Protect Economic Gains

Economic gains were one of the major considerations which led to the military intervention in Mozambique. Economically there was need to reduce dependence on South Africa and this did not only apply to landlocked Zimbabwe but even to other members of the Frontline States. Zimbabwe enjoyed the status of an economic power house of the frontline states and had a major role to play in the sub regional political and economic issues. Zimbabwe hence had to maintain the trade routes comprising road, rail, and other communication routes for exports and imports to and from ports in Mozambique and Malawi. FAM (Forças Armadas de Mocambique/ Mozambique Armed Force) could not protect these vital routes especially the Beira Corridor. Thus the South African port was a bit far from Zimbabwe that is 2065 kilometers from Harare but Mozambique laid about 600kilometres from Harare hence Zimbabwe had to do with the closest port that is Beira with low costs. According to Swedish consultants, SWECO, savings using the port of Beira instead of Durban including transport costs amounted to US\$105-00 per ton. Both Zimbabwe and Malawi could save US\$269 million in foreign exchange by using Beira based on trade traffic of 777,000 tons for Malawi through South African port and 1.2 million tons for

Zimbabwe. According to T. Moyo (2007) apart from Beira the cheapest route to the sea for Zimbabwe was through the Chicualacuala-Maputo railway line. However due to financial resources problems and shortage of manpower, the protection of this line had to be shelved for quite some time while efforts were concentrated on the Beira Corridor. These serves to explain that across the board all trade routes through Mozambique were viable options which any country whose focus was economic development could not ignore. According to senior official he highlighted also the road economic interest of Zimbabwe. He stated that on the Nyamapanda-Tete-Zobue Corridor commercial vehicles transporting maize to Zimbabwe during years of drought were protected from RENAMO attack. This corridor was described as the route that kept hunger away from Zimbabwe as it was moved through it from Malawi. Mugoba (2018) stated that the fact that the road linking Maputo and Beira were subject to ambushes by rebels hence it called for the military escorts to all commercial vehicles until up to when the situation deteriorated.

MILITARY INTERVENTION TO POLITICAL INTERESTS

National political interests were key determinants in as far as the Zimbabwe governments

Decision for intervention was concerned. With its gaining of independence in 1980, Harare became Southern Africa's diplomatic hub and a key player in the Frontline States' efforts to dismantle apartheid and colonialism. Zimbabwe adhered to the positions of the Southern African Development Community, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Commonwealth. In 1983/4 and 1991/2 Zimbabwe assumed one of the non-permanent seats in the United Nations Security Council. Assumption of these positions gave it significant skills in international affairs. The 1986 NAM summit meeting was held in Harare and Zimbabwe leader who was then the prime minister Robert Mugabe became chair of the organization. As the chair, Zimbabwe strongly argued against apartheid and frequently called for the imposition of economic sanctions against Pretoria. Zimbabwe helped launch the African Fund whose main aim was to assist the liberation movements in Namibia and South Africa, and Southern African states threatened by Pretoria's policy of destabilization. With this exposure and position in the region, Zimbabwe government had an obligation to lead by example in defending the sovereign legitimacy of FRELIMO. This responsibility could have been the rationale behind Harare playing a leading role in taking political initiative to thwarting this conflict.

Zimbabwe foreign policy trajectory was governed by sanctity of the right to life, self-determination, defense of national sovereignty, anti-imperialism, equality of sovereign states. This guided its foreign relations the Mozambican civil war and

possible occupation of Mozambique by the RENAMO (Apartheid backed), would be a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Mozambique by RENAMO and would make a mockery to the gains of nationalism and the Marxist socialist ideology. Zimbabwe felt that it could not shirk its responsibilities to a neighbor under apartheid and imperialism threat thus the intervention of Zimbabwe in the conflicts was guided by political interests with protection of sovereignty and fight of imperialism being the motivating factor.

President Mugabe further noted that as Commander-in-Chief, he took the necessary action to come to the aid of an aggressed neighbor whose security was under threat of rebel insurgency attacks. The Zimbabwean Premier was merely responding to an urgent appeal by the Mozambican government. Robinson (2006) points out that there was an emergence call for intervention of the Zimbabwean government. The main role was defensive purpose thus the guarding of key economic zones in Mozambique. There was also protection of FRELIMO officials by the ZNA. The intervention emerges to be motivated by Pan African defense, with Zimbabwe helping another Pan African counterpart. As Rupiya (2002) puts it across, the intervention was based on principle. Zimbabwe could not stand to see a sovereign government being destroyed white supremacist oriented insurgent groups like the RENAMO.

There are certain factors that could then have possibly made the national political interests of Zimbabwe government vital or primary in terms of its decision to undertake the military intervention. Some scholars argue that Zimbabwe wanted to portray that revolutionary post-independence government were worth and had the capacity to govern their states. Dava et al (2013) postulates that the conflict was a threat to the perceived governing capabilities of republic governments. Immediate thwarting of the conflict would help in building the credibility of Black Nationalist politics. According to B. Mupasu (2018), the RENAMO was a counter to the Marxist Socialist ideology which was the motivating factor for the Black Nationalist movements in Zimbabwe and the Region as a whole or even the whole African continent. If RENAMO seized power this would have seen the wave of the rejuvenated imperialism spreading into Zimbabwe and later in the region as whole. In this line the decision of military intervention was based on national political interests and the desire to protect the Marxist socialists' ideology and the prestige of Black Nationalist regime being the driving force. Nationalism influenced the decision of venturing.

Also, view of Harare, defending the Kinshasa regime through the deployment of troops was for the survival of regional peace, security and stability. The removal of FRELIMO regime through an act of

aggression could have affected Harare's retention of those regional peace values and norms. A unpeaceful region is not a conducive environment for investment and if furthered, is highly consequential to the whole region. This would compromise investment opportunities and also attract attention of the international world through peace keeping commissions.

As presented military intervention was a necessary evil whose justification is reasonable. Anonymous 1 stated that the shared nationalistic perceptiveness had a play in the intervention which saved the day. The RENAMO was an imperialist and outfit that aimed at reversing the idea of anti-imperialism and decolonization that had swept the whole region except South Africa. Ndhlovu (2017) poses that Mozambique has been seized by RENAMO. The next possible apartheid regime target could have been Zimbabwe. It has been held by scholars that the intervention by Zimbabwe issues of high politics as it was a defensive move to nationalism against South Africa's strategic framework of destabilizing Zimbabwe because of its stance towards Apartheid and its possibility of dominating the region. Dzimba (1998) postulates that South Africa had the aim of making the life of Mugabe not easy. It thrived to dismantle the gains of independence and combat his commitment to multi-racial society which posed a series threat to Apartheid.

Hathaway (2005) suggests that the intervention was a political strategy guided by the quest to protect nationalism. The intervention was in fact an indirect confrontation of the SA government which thrived to make his life hard and protect the ideology of nationalism which formed the base of their bilateral relations. Gail (2016) even comments this by suggesting that the domestic policy of sovereignty integrity, economic growth, anti-imperialism and socialist Marxist inclination between the two, made it into more foreign relations and this prompted the intervention into the conflict with this quest of cushioning the mutual interests that was mainly driven by the spirit of nationalism. The mutual interdependence of the relations and liberation struggle history manifested itself through military intervention in the conflict with the objective of protecting the shared history. It is against this background that the military intervention was a justified move of protecting nationalism which had been compromised by RENAMO insurgences in the region.

Military Intervention to Necessitate Bilateral Coordination

According to Ngwenya (2018), the Zimbabwe – Mozambique relationship stretches back to the liberation age up to this contemporary age has been complex interdependence which a relationship that would be costly to break. Baldwin (1980) even suggests that the relationship is built on a cost – benefit analysis

and heavy on either side in the event the relationship falls apart. Economic, social and political development in both countries is extricable tied in the bilateral coordination and breaking away would be costly to both the parties. Chikanga (2018) noted that the interdependency of the two is understood along sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensitivity is the extent to which one country is affected by the actions of the one in another, whereas vulnerability is the extent to which a country can, by adopting policies insulates itself for the costly effect of the events that occur elsewhere. Interdependence is then understood as a mutual dependence a condition in which countries are both sensate and vulnerable to each other. The intervention of Zimbabwe in the civil war is understood here as a vulnerability and insulation from the economic, political and social constraints effected by the RENAMO insurgent attacks. The attacks emerged to be highly consequential to both parties and a direct attack to the spoils from the bilateral relations. Machalak (1979) postulates that that the interdependence nature of Zimbabwe – Mozambique bilateral relations made intervention inevitable for the survival of either the parties is detrimental to the other. The use of military force is in this context a justified move of the mutual interests enveloping in the interdependent nature of bilateral relations. Whereas scholars support this by suggesting that the highly dependent nature of South African states is necessitated by their bounding framework. The interconnectedness of the states necessitates the relation that is highly dependent with costly to both. Zimbabwe felt the insurgences economically; politically and socially thus intervention was a necessary move to instill a healthy bilateral coordination between the two.

Dava *et al.* (2013) supports this stance by suggesting that the relationship is mutually interdependent on the basis of economies politics and social and their shared liberation struggle makes the two inseparable. However, realists' scholars like Baldwin (2010) postulates that interstate relations are centered on politics as mainly personal interests takes charge of decisions taken by leaders. These scholars suggest that Mugabe's personal interests took of the decision of military intervention. It is highlighted that he did not get much support for intervention into the conflict from his government but instead he decided to engage suggests that Zimbabwe's military dimension was by far the most prominent and controversial since it did not get much support even from the minister of defense. It was instead Mugabe's personal quest for power that acted under the disguise of protecting the interstate connectedness that exists between the two. In context of the above, it is indeed justified that the interstate dependency of Zimbabwe and Mozambique was a coercing factor to military intervention to protect the interconnectedness of the two. It will be however unjustified not to consider the play on personal interests in decision making.

Table 1: Zimbabwe's military intervention grew as time progress

Year	Number of Troops Deployed to the Conflict
1983	1000
1984	3 000
1986	12 000

Source: Alao (2015)

It is however not clear on the reasons why the increased military involvement but however some possible explanations could be preferred. The first reason could be that there was a renewed call of assistance from the FRELIMO government urging the Zimbabwean army to transform its engagement from being defensive to offensive. Secondly, Zimbabwe's quest to effectively and permanently protect the Beira Corridor coupled with in the army may have been an influential element in the increase in the military involvement in the conflict.

Former president R.G Mugabe gave assurance in his quest to defend nationalism which is gleamed from his statement on the call to commemorate the death of Mozambican president Samora Machel.

Regional Stability

The conflict in Mozambique passed to be a threat in Southern African region. Many countries like Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia and Tanzania felt the economic and political consequences of the conflict. Cadeado & Hamela (2009) suggests that Mozambique's is strategic geographical position in southern Africa and it has the privilege of being the main corridor for the land locked countries to access international markets.

Chimanikire (2003) also comments this by suggesting that it is an economic hub for most of the region's economy with conflict being highly consequential to the region's economy. A blockade of compromise to these economic flows economic growth in most parts of the region. Politically, if RENAMO had won control of Mozambique, this could have compromised the ideal of block nationalism and independence which had itself in most part of southern Africa. Ndlovu suggests that RENAMO success in Mozambique would exalt Apartheid monopoly in the region and indirectly establish Apartheid South Africa as region's powerhouse. Thus, undermining Marxist socialism ideology in most pact of this region. Also, some part of the region border with Mozambique like Malawi felt the impact of the war. Tsiko (2018) commented that the RENAMO attack in the northern parts led to schools' closure, deaths of civilians, looting etc. Zimbabwe, as a symbol of relative stability in southern Africa intervened in the conflict so as to maintain the region's stability and impede its compromise to most parts of the region. Sheila (1998) supports this and suggests that the quest to cushion the

region from consequences of the conflict coerced Zimbabwe to military intervene in the conflict.

Zimbabwean government saw it as its duty to maintain regional peace and security. The situation in Mozambique involves a threat to international peace; thus, the Zimbabwe had a duty to intervene. Some type of military intervention almost certainly was necessary to subdue or end the conflict in Mozambique; thus, military intervention was justified. To make matters worse, RENAMO has suggested that it will expand the war to the population centers of Mozambique and Zimbabwe which was a threat to the region as a whole.

Humanitarian Intervention

Humanitarian intervention has been labeled a critical compelling factor to military intervention on a national, regional and inter-regional and even on the international spectrum. The protection of human kind against altercation waged by insurgent RENAMO group compelled the Zimbabwe government to take up the decision of military intervention so as to protect human integrity. However, the justification of military intervention to protect citizens from abuse can be understood in the context of the Just War Theory [bellum iustum] which clearly complements the engagement of Zimbabwe in the Mozambican civil war.

Philosophers of the just war theory like St Augustine argued that the justness of action could be judged without evaluating the driving intention, so also with the state action of going to war. Thomas Aquinas also argues that war must be waged by a competent authority and there should be a justifiable cause for that war. Therefore, “just cause for war could be found in peace restoration, assistance of neighbors and most notably the defense of the poor and oppressed. In these arguments, military intervention is a justifiable cause if it is in the interests of protecting innocent people from the atrocities of clashes. In this context, state sovereignty only as long as it does not violate citizenry rights, but once it pursues practices that outrage human beings even beyond the state, other states have a legitimate right to intervene. Military intervention by Zimbabwe in Mozambique was compelled by its quest to stop the slaughter of innocent civilians. According to Ziwire (2018), Military intervention in the context of humanitarian protection is a justifiable cause of use of force for the protection of people within Mozambique and even in Zimbabwe itself from the treatment that abusive and arbitrary.

Mupasu (2018) asserted that there has been records of civilian attacks in Mozambique and areas bordering Zimbabwe and Mozambique like Chipinge, Mount Darwin, Rushinga which claimed a large sum of innocent lives. Raids and kidnappings were also affected by the RENAMO for military mobilization in the aforementioned areas. This compromised human security which is a critical component for societal

security and human survival. The open confrontations and civilian raids by the RENAMO/MNR is a clear-cut picture of the gravity of the civil disturbances that instead required emergency military intervention.

Citizenry protection became the priority of the Zimbabwean army. Its engagement was aimed at protecting humankind from the arbitral and abusive actions of the RENAMO rebel group. Alao suggests that the increased pressure of the international community for Zimbabwe to intervene in the conflict for humanitarian protection of the innocent civilians had an effect in making the decision. Military intervention was a justified move to instantly stop the human suffering as other conflict resolution models like mitigation, intermediation take a prolonged time to achieve the intended results. This cements it as a noble strategy with the philosophy of the “end justifies the means” guiding these actions.

The human rights situation in Mozambique is currently among the worst in the world, a situation some commentators have called a holocaust, ever since the insurgency. An insurgency displaced or seriously affected almost six million Mozambicans. Mozambicans who remain in Mozambique face starvation and heinous brutality. Due to foreign military intervention, massive refugee problems, threats of fighting spreading to neighboring states, and the degree and scope of human rights violations, the effects of the insurgency have gone beyond Mozambique's borders making Mozambique's civil war a matter of international concern.

Foreign military intervention may be the only possible means of ending the insurgency and improving life for Mozambique's civilian population.

RENAMO's insurgency, which is responsible for brutal acts against civilians, along with droughts and failed economic policies turned Mozambique into a land of carnage and human suffering. Closely linked to this was the refugee problem that had hit had on Zimbabwe all because of the civil War. The increasing number of innocent civilians fleeing the atrocities of the civil engagements in Mozambique negatively impacted the livelihood of the common Zimbabwean civilian. This led to increased pressure on the nation's resources and the inhuman setting at most of the refugee camps gave a gloomy picture of human survival. The picture above shows a picture of Mozambican refugees in a refugee camp in Mozambique. Cases of poor sanitation, food security and increased diseases outbreak was the order of the day Dava et al . The drought and famine that hit the region further escalated the situation thus calling for emergency intervention to stop the situation.

It is estimated that RENAMO's insurgency displaced or seriously affected so many civilians. To

make matters worse, RENAMO has suggested that it will expand the war to the population centers of Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Given the bitter antagonism between FRELIMO and RENAMO, some type of international military intervention will be required to end the insurgency. With this threat on civilians in both Zimbabwe and Mozambique, and the decision that intervention was needed to protect people, military intervention was justified.

The legitimacy and illegitimacy of military intervention on the grounds of that on the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. Scholars like Walzer argues that sovereignty itself is a moral good because self-determination, and hence sovereignty, is the only way that a people can be free. The principle of sovereignty is, therefore, inviolable in principle. There are some cases, when the state grossly violates its own citizen's human rights, and in this case the intervention is justified. A sovereign state that violates its people's rights also loses its right to sovereignty. Walzer (year) further argues that:

“When a government turns savagely upon its own people, we must doubt the very existence of a political community to which the idea of self-determination might apply...People who initiate massacres lose their right to participate in the processes of domestic self-determination. Their military defeat is morally necessary....”

The controversy of humanitarian intervention lies in the fact that the sovereignty of the targeted state is being violated by whomever is intervening in the domestic politics, even though it is on humanitarian grounds. It has been held by numerous scholars that the international system is based on the principle that each state is autonomous and therefore independent. In this context each country “has the right in its internal affairs to be free from any coercion assisted by other states. Sovereignty grants state autonomy and the right to self-determination. This would bear with it full legislative powers and rights to make laws and execute them. Therefore, all states are equal and enjoy sovereign rights.

The UN Charter argues that all states are equal before international law irrespective of comparable size and wealth. This principle of the sovereign equality of states has been enshrined in Article 2.1 of the UN Charter. It entails the country's sole right to make laws within its territory. States are prevented from intervening “in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. If that duty is violated, the victim state has the further right to defend its territorial integrity and political independence”. This however does not preclude legitimate humanitarian intervention when morally required, where the use of force is intended to stop the slaughter of innocent civilians by states, which hide behind sovereignty and the concept of the norm of non-

intervention in carrying out such actions. ICISS argues that humanitarian intervention is associated with justifiable means of using force for the purpose of protecting the people in another state, “from the treatment which is so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the limits of that authority within which the sovereignty is presumed to act with reason”.

The danger of escalation of an armed conflict means that any intervention, even on humanitarian grounds, should be avoided. This is an important concern because such an escalation may ultimately lead to a large-scale war. In this context, the Zimbabwe intervention in the Mozambique civil war may have been necessitated by humanitarian concerns and the quest to protect human kind being the coercing factor to taking on the decision

Military Intervention as a way to protect the Legacy of the liberation Struggle

The rationale of Zimbabwe's military intervention back dates to its attainment of independence. During the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe, Mozambique paved way to assist Zimbabwe by providing a sanctuary to Zimbabwe. Mozambique provided bases for Zimbabwe; Zimbabwean guerillas were now operating from Mozambique. Guerillas were now trained in Mozambique at Chimoio, Chifombo, Tembwe, Nyadzonya, Takawira 1, Takawira 2, Nachingweya, Mavhonde and also refugee camps such as Doroyi 1-8 and Nyaminga base could be found in Mozambique. Hence by so doing this cemented a strong relationship between Zimbabwe and Mozambique since some FRELIMO soldiers could also take part in the liberation movements for Zimbabwe. Mozambique also assisted Zimbabwe through assistance through food, health facilities. After the attainment of Independence of Zimbabwe, Mozambique still protected the Chimoio Shrine as a Historical Monument for Zimbabwe hence people still visit Mozambique in remembrance of the gallant sons and daughters who perished during the liberation struggle Chimoio attack in Mozambique. Also, they are mass graves in Mozambique and a museum has been made as a way to keep the history of Zimbabwe.

CONCLUSION

This research paper attempted to identify, ascertain and evaluate the respective interests of Zimbabwe in Mozambique and how these interests informed the decision of military intervention in the civil conflict. A brief analysis of the underlying definitions of military intervention was made in the first section and these shaped the understanding of what constitutes military intervention and the ethos that guide the intentions of military intervention. These have been identified to be political, economic and humanitarian grounds which usually shape the intention of military intervention. National interests under these grounds, is presented to be a highly influential component that is

behind the economic, political and humanitarian motives of a military intervention.

It was observed that the intervening state's domestic objectives shape their foreign relations and use of the military arm in its foreign aims. The intended aim of the intervening state is based on its political, economic and humanitarian interests that directly underpin its domestic policy interests. Zimbabwe's intervention into the civil directly reflects its domestic interests which had been negatively impacted by the civil insurgencies in the sixteen-year-old civil disturbance and this has been contextualized by the definitions provided in this section

The second section critically highlighted the possible contributory factors that may have primarily influenced the decision of military intervention. These are categorized into political, economic and humanitarian with all these having a degree of relevance to the decision. It was observed that the motivating factor for the intervention was to protect economic interests. The conflict destroyed infrastructure that was critical for Zimbabwe economic security. Zimbabwe's economic interests in Mozambique and access to the Beira Corridor, was influential in its decision to intervene in the conflict. It aimed to protect the ports which were critical in its access of international markets and access to fuel. The population of Mozambique was also critical as it provided a wide market of Zimbabwean goods and good efficient labor market for the Zimbabwe industry. This necessitated military intervention as a defensive strategy to the economic interests that were under threat from RENAMO insurgency attacks.

The government's decision of intervention may also be influenced by political interests of maintaining and defending nationalism. The apartheid regime aimed at reversing the tide of Black Nationalism that had swept most parts of Southern Africa thus its covert use of RENAMO, would have reversed Mozambique sovereignty and later on that of Zimbabwe. The regional bilateral connections between the two made the intervention inevitable. The unilateral intervention in this context is presented to be motivated by these political factors being the influencing factors.

It has also been discovered in this section that humanitarian intervention may have been the ground for military intervention by Zimbabwe in the Mozambique civil war. The desire of protecting the innocent civilians from the brutalities of the war influenced the Zimbabwe government to opt for military intervention as a viable strategy to stop the killings. However, this section has also provided some possible justifications that go beyond the categories and may have been critical in influencing the decision-making process in the foreign endeavor. The fact that the African leaders are the sole decision makers in foreign policy related endeavors.

The concept of deliberate foreign policy gives full autonomy of diplomatic relations to the president without being cognoscente to the laid-out structure that legitimizes foreign interventions. This had a play in the decision of military intervention as the discussions in this chapter reveals that the intervention may was because of the powerful autonomy and personal of Robert Mugabe in the conflict.

All these sections have aided our understanding of the real tangible factors that influenced the decision of military intervention and justifications that cements the intervention legitimacy. It extensively addresses the first objective of this research that seeks to unearth the rationale behind military intervention by Zimbabwe and provides a framework of grounded understanding of military intervention. Coupling this will be a phonological lived experience that were gleaned through interviews and this has not been adequately addressed by sections in this chapter. This will be adequately sufficed by the next chapter that provides a summary of the research findings and when amalgamated with this section, a formidable rich research is produced and meets the third objective of the research which is to assist fellow academias in the field of the study and create a grounded understanding of what military intervention really is. It is in the next chapter that this research will complement the propositions in this chapter with the true lived experiences of the interviewees.

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