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Towards A Legal Mandate: The Struggle for the Recognition of the July 2024 Revolution in Bangladesh

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Abstract: The July 2024 Revolution in Bangladesh produced a transformative political moment, resulting in the adoption of the July Revolution Charter 2025, a document symbolizing demands for democratic legitimacy, repealing fascism, institutional reform, and political inclusivity. However, its legal foundation remains contested, particularly ahead of the scheduled national election in February 2026. Jamaat-e-Islami and six other political parties have mobilized to press for the constitutional and statutory recognition of this Charter, viewing it as essential for ensuring abolition of future totalitarianism, electoral fairness and political stability. This paper critically examines the struggle for legal mandate, analyzing the interplay between revolutionary legitimacy, constitutionalism, and electoral politics in Bangladesh. Drawing on constitutional law, democratic theory, and comparative experiences, the article investigates whether the July 2024 Charter can evolve from a symbolic revolutionary achievement into a binding legal framework. The findings highlight the tensions between popular sovereignty and legal formalism in shaping Bangladesh's democratic trajectory.

Keywords: July 2024 Revolution, Legal Mandate, Bangladesh Politics, Constitutionalism, Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (BJI), Electoral Legitimacy, Democratic Transition.

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INTRODUCTION

Background of the July 2024 Revolution

The July 2024 Revolution in Bangladesh marked a pivotal moment in the nation's political history. What began as a student-led protest against discriminatory civil service quotas rapidly evolved into a widespread uprising that culminated in the resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the establishment of an interim government led by Nobel laureate Professor Dr. Muhammad Yunus (The Diplomat, 2025). This revolution, often termed the "Gen Z revolution," was characterized by its youth-driven momentum and its demand for systemic reforms in governance and justice (Al Jazeera, 2025).

Central to this upheaval was the "July Declaration," a document that encapsulated the aspirations of the revolutionaries. The declaration called for constitutional recognition of the uprising, the acknowledgment of its martyrs as national heroes, and the institutionalization of its core principles into the national framework (The Business Standard, 2025). As Bangladesh approaches its next national election, scheduled for February 2026 (BBC News, 5 August 2025; Reuters, 2025), the legal status of the July Declaration remains a contentious issue. Political entities, including Jamaat-e-Islami and six other political parties, have demanded that the declaration be legally recognized and incorporated into the constitution to

ensure the legitimacy of the forthcoming electoral process (The Daily Star, 2025).

This paper aims to examine the historical and political context of the July 2024 Revolution, analyze the symbolism and substance of the July Declaration, and delve into the ongoing legal debates surrounding its recognition. By doing so, it seeks to understand the challenges and implications of integrating a revolutionary document into a nation's constitutional framework.

Scope of the Paper

This paper critically examines the legal, constitutional, and political dimensions of the July 2024 Revolution Charter in Bangladesh, focusing on its potential transition from a symbolic revolutionary document to a binding legal framework. It analyzes the historical evolution of constitutional legitimacy, the content and political significance of the Charter, and the challenges of integrating revolutionary demands into existing legal structures (Teitel, 2000; Ackerman, 1991). The study explores the strategies of Jamaat-e-Islami and allied parties advocating for legal recognition and assesses implications for the February 2026 national election. It also draws on comparative experiences from countries such as South Africa, Chile, and Egypt to identify possible legal pathways for legitimizing revolutionary mandates (Spitz & Chaskalson, 2000; Brown, 2019). While it does not endorse any political

agenda, the paper contributes to scholarly debates on constitutionalism, popular sovereignty, and democratic transitions in Bangladesh.

OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH

The primary objective of this research is to critically examine the legal, constitutional, and political dynamics surrounding the recognition of the July 2024 Revolution Charter in Bangladesh. As a transformative socio-political event, the July Revolution has introduced new demands for legitimacy, accountability, and participatory governance. Yet, the absence of formal constitutional validation raises critical questions about the relationship between revolutionary legitimacy and legal authority in a democratic framework (Teitel, 2000; Ackerman, 1991).

This study aims to achieve the following specific objectives:

1. To analyze the historical and political evolution of the July 2024 revolutionary legitimacy and its influence on constitutional development in Bangladesh since independence (Choudhury, 1972; Riaz, 2016).
2. To examine the content and political significance of the July 2024 Charter and its role in shaping popular demands for democratic governance (Habermas, 1996; Kabir, 2020).
3. To investigate the constitutional and statutory challenges associated with integrating a revolutionary document (the July Charter 2025) into the existing legal framework (Elster, 1995; Faruqui, 2010).
4. To explore the strategies and demands of Jamaat-e-Islami and allied political parties seeking formal recognition of the Charter (Riaz & Fair, 2011; Hasan, 2023).
5. To compare Bangladesh's situation with international precedents, identifying legal mechanisms used elsewhere to institutionalize revolutionary mandates (Siavelis, 2009; Spitz & Chaskalson, 2000).
6. To propose viable legal and political pathways toward harmonizing revolutionary ideals with constitutional order (Mounk, 2018; Huntington, 1991).

By fulfilling these objectives, the study seeks to contribute to broader debates on constitutional legitimacy, popular sovereignty, and transitional justice in emerging democracies in Bangladesh.

METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH

This research adopts a qualitative and analytical methodology grounded in constitutional law, political science, and comparative legal studies to examine the struggle for legal recognition of the July 2024 Revolution Charter in Bangladesh. A doctrinal legal analysis is

conducted to review constitutional provisions, statutory laws, and judicial decisions relevant to integrating revolutionary documents into the legal framework (Faruqui, 2010; Elster, 1995). The study also employs historical and political contextualization to trace the evolution of legitimacy and governance structures in Bangladesh (Riaz, 2016).

A comparative analysis explores international experiences — including South Africa's post-apartheid settlement, Chile's plebiscite, and Egypt's constitutional transition — to identify applicable lessons (Spitz & Chaskalson, 2000; Brown, 2019). Additionally, content analysis of the July 2024 Charter and political statements by Jamaat-e-Islami and allied political parties helps assessing their demands and strategies (Kabir, 2020). Finally, a systematic literature review integrates scholarly debates on revolutionary legitimacy, constitutionalism, and democratic transitions (Teitel, 2000; Habermas, 1996). This multi-dimensional approach enables a comprehensive understanding of the legal, political, and institutional challenges of transforming a revolutionary charter into a constitutional mandate while offering insights into possible legal pathways for democratic consolidation in Bangladesh.

Historical and Political Context

Bangladesh's political landscape has been shaped by a series of democratic transitions and authoritarian reversals. The country's journey from its liberation in 1971 to the present has been marked by periods of military rule, political instability, and struggles for democratic consolidation (The Diplomat, 2025). The Awami League, under the leadership of Sheikh Hasina, had been a dominant force in Bangladeshi politics for over a decade. However, her government's increasing authoritarian tendencies, including the suppression of opposition parties and curtailment of civil liberties, led to widespread disillusionment among the populace (Al Jazeera, 2025).

The immediate catalyst for the July 2024 Revolution was the reinstatement of discriminatory civil service quotas, which disproportionately affected students from marginalized communities. The Students Against Discrimination coalition spearheaded protests demanding equitable representation and an end to systemic biases in public sector recruitment (The Diplomat, 2025). The government's violent crackdown on these protests, culminating in the "July Massacre," where hundreds of protesters were killed, intensified public outrage and broadened the movement's base (The Diplomat, 2025).

This period of unrest was not just a reaction to specific policies but also a manifestation of deeper grievances related to governance, corruption, and the erosion of democratic norms. The revolution thus represented a collective demand for a more inclusive, transparent, and accountable political system.

The July Revolution Charter 2025: Symbolism and Substance

The July Declaration emerged as a symbolic document representing the collective aspirations of the revolutionaries. It articulated a vision for a Bangladesh that upholds justice, equality, and democratic principles. Beyond its symbolic value, the declaration outlined concrete demands, including the recognition of the uprising's martyrs as national heroes, the provision of legal protections for participants, and the incorporation of its principles into the constitutional framework (The Business Standard, 2025).

However, the substance of the declaration extends beyond these demands. It signifies a rupture with the past and a call for a new political order. The interim government's endorsement of the declaration underscored its commitment to the revolution's ideals and its intention to institutionalize these principles through legal and constitutional reforms (The Business Standard, 2025).

The challenge lies in translating this symbolic document into binding legal norms. While the declaration reflects the will of a significant portion of the populace, its integration into the legal system requires careful deliberation to ensure it aligns with existing constitutional principles and does not undermine the rule of law.

The Legal Debate

The legal recognition of the July Declaration has sparked intense debates among legal scholars, political analysts, and policymakers. Central to this discourse is the question of whether a revolutionary document can be seamlessly integrated into a nation's legal framework without disrupting constitutional continuity.

Bangladesh's Constitution, adopted in 1972, has undergone several amendments over the years. However, the process of constitutional change has often been contentious, with debates over the legitimacy of amendments and the preservation of the constitution's basic structure (The Daily Star, 2025). The introduction of the July Declaration into this context raises questions about its compatibility with the existing constitutional order.

Proponents of the declaration's legal recognition argue that it embodies the democratic will of the people and reflects the need for systemic reforms. They contend that acknowledging the declaration constitutionally would legitimize the revolution and pave the way for meaningful change (The Business Standard, 2025). On the other hand, critics caution against hasty constitutional amendments, warning that such actions could set a precedent for undermining constitutional stability and the rule of law (The Daily Star, 2025).

The interim government's role in this process is also a point of contention. While it has facilitated the drafting of the July Declaration, questions arise about its authority to enact constitutional changes without a popularly elected mandate. This situation underscores the tension between revolutionary legitimacy and constitutional legality, a dilemma faced by many nations undergoing transitions from authoritarian regimes to democratic governance.

Implications for the 2026 Election

The upcoming national election, scheduled for February 2026, serves as a critical juncture in Bangladesh's political trajectory. The legal recognition—or lack thereof—of the July 2024 Certificate has direct implications for electoral legitimacy, voter confidence, and political stability. The core concern is whether an electoral process can be considered free, fair, and representative when a significant segment of the population and political actors demand formal acknowledgment of the revolution's outcomes (Hassan, 2024).

Jamaat-e-Islami and six other allied parties have emphasized that recognizing the July Declaration as a legal mandate would ensure that the elections reflect revolutionary aspirations and not merely entrenched political power (Rahman, 2025). Failure to incorporate the certificate risks delegitimizing the electoral process, potentially leading to boycotts, protests, or post-election unrest (Chowdhury, 2023). Comparative studies indicate that when revolutionary demands are ignored prior to elections, countries often face prolonged instability and weakened democratic institutions (Schedler, 2015; Levitsky & Way, 2010).

Furthermore, recognition of the certificate could influence the design of the electoral system. Proposals include adopting proportional representation mechanisms or ensuring quotas for youth and marginalized groups, aligning electoral processes with the revolution's principles (Ahmed, 2024). Conversely, critics argue that rushing constitutional amendments or electoral changes to satisfy revolutionary demands may compromise institutional integrity and set precedents for politically motivated legal reforms (Hossain, 2023). Thus, the tension between revolutionary legitimacy and constitutionalism becomes particularly acute in the electoral context.

COMPARATIVE LESSONS

Understanding the legal and political challenges posed by the July Revolution Charter 2025 requires situating Bangladesh's experience within a broader comparative context. Numerous countries have navigated the complex task of integrating revolutionary or transitional charters into formal legal frameworks. These global experiences — from Tunisia and South

Africa to Nepal, Chile, and Egypt — provide valuable insights into how states reconcile revolutionary legitimacy with constitutional continuity, while maintaining political stability and democratic governance (Diamond, 2008; Posner & Young, 2007).

Tunisia: Institutionalizing Revolutionary Aspirations

Following the Arab Spring uprising of 2011, Tunisia embarked on a transformative constitutional process aimed at embedding the principles of revolution into the state's legal structure. The 2014 Tunisian Constitution was a product of intense negotiation between secular and Islamist forces, civil society groups, and revolutionary movements (Marks, 2016). It codified core demands — such as democratic governance, gender equality, and human rights — without dismantling the state apparatus. Importantly, Tunisia's experience underscores the significance of inclusive constitution-making **and** dialogue among political actors, ensuring that revolutionary ideals are institutionalized without provoking institutional collapse (Elster, 1995; O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986).

South Africa: From Liberation Struggle to Constitutionalism

South Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy illustrates another model of successful revolutionary incorporation. The 1996 Constitution institutionalized the ideals of the anti-apartheid movement — equality, non-discrimination, and social justice — within a legal framework that preserved democratic governance (Lodge, 2002). The key to this transition was a negotiated settlement between the African National Congress (ANC) and the apartheid regime, facilitated by inclusive dialogues and transitional mechanisms such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Spitz & Chaskalson, 2000). This case demonstrates the necessity of balancing revolutionary demands with pragmatic compromises, a lesson highly relevant for Bangladesh's attempt to formalize the July 2024 Charter.

Nepal: Challenges of Delayed Legalization

Nepal's post-2006 revolution experience highlights the risks of failing to promptly institutionalize revolutionary goals. The overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of a republic were initially celebrated, but delays in constitutional drafting and political infighting led to instability and public disillusionment (Sharma, 2015). The eventual 2015 Constitution incorporated many revolutionary aspirations, including federalism and social inclusion, but the slow pace of legal transformation undermined public trust. For Bangladesh, Nepal's experience underscores the importance of timely legal recognition of revolutionary mandates to maintain political momentum and legitimacy.

Chile: Democratic Transition through Plebiscite and Constitutional Reform

Chile's experience offers a critical lesson in gradual but decisive revolutionary transition. The 1988 plebiscite, which rejected Augusto Pinochet's continued rule, served as a mechanism for popular sovereignty to shape political transformation (Siavelis, 2009). Subsequent constitutional reforms in the 1990s and beyond gradually dismantled the authoritarian framework and incorporated democratic principles into Chile's constitutional order (Barros, 2002). Chile's case demonstrates that revolutionary legitimacy does not always require abrupt legal rupture; rather, incremental reforms, guided by popular will and legal continuity, can achieve profound democratic transformation. Bangladesh might similarly consider using referenda or constitutional amendments to legitimize the July Charter while maintaining legal stability.

Egypt: The Dangers of Exclusion and Rapid Overreach

Egypt's post-2011 transition illustrates the perils of failing to balance revolutionary demands with institutional inclusivity. After the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak, the 2012 Constitution, heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, faced legitimacy crises due to insufficient stakeholder engagement and perceptions of partisan dominance (Brown, 2013). The subsequent military intervention and 2014 constitutional rewrite reflected a reassertion of authoritarian control, illustrating how exclusionary processes and rushed transitions can undermine revolutionary gains (Brownlee, Masoud, & Reynolds, 2015). Bangladesh's path should therefore prioritize broad political participation, transparent drafting, and national consensus to avoid similar pitfalls.

Key Lessons for Bangladesh

The comparative evidence reveals several critical lessons. Timing is essential — delays, as in Nepal, can erode revolutionary momentum. Inclusivity and negotiation, exemplified by Tunisia and South Africa, ensure that revolutionary charters gain broad legitimacy. Legal mechanisms such as referenda and constitutional amendments, as seen in Chile, provide structured pathways for transformation. Finally, avoiding exclusionary politics, a lesson from Egypt, is vital for sustaining democratic consolidation. Symbolic measures — such as public commemorations, civic education, and national ceremonies — can further entrench revolutionary legitimacy (Tilly, 2004; Norris, 2011).

For Bangladesh, these lessons suggest that the July 2024 Charter's legal recognition must be pursued through a comprehensive, participatory, and transparent process that harmonizes revolutionary aspirations with constitutional principles. Such an approach will not only safeguard institutional stability but also ensure that the

revolution's transformative spirit is preserved in the nation's legal and political order.

FINDINGS OF THE RESEARCH

The findings of this research reveal a complex interplay between revolutionary legitimacy, constitutional order, and democratic transformation in Bangladesh. The July 2024 Revolution, marked by mass mobilization and demands for systemic reform, has emerged as a pivotal moment in the country's political trajectory. Its central product — the *July Revolution Charter* — has gained significant symbolic and political weight, yet remains without legal force, creating a tension between popular sovereignty and constitutional formalism (Habermas, 1996; Teitel, 2000).

The July Charter 2025 Reflects Genuine Democratic Aspirations

One of the most significant findings is that the July Revolution Charter 2025 embodies widespread public demand for participatory governance, accountability, and institutional reform. Large-scale demonstrations and grassroots mobilization reflected a deep frustration with entrenched political elites, electoral manipulation, and governance failures (Riaz, 2016; Hasan, 2023). The Charter's emphasis on judicial independence, transparent elections, and decentralization resonates strongly with democratic norms and global constitutional principles (Mounk, 2018; Dahl, 1989).

Public opinion surveys and political mobilizations following July 2024 demonstrate that a substantial portion of the population views the Charter as a legitimate roadmap for democratic renewal. This reflects the principle of popular sovereignty, where authority should derive from the will of the people rather than entrenched constitutional structures alone (Rousseau, 1762; Locke, 1690).

Legal and Constitutional Barriers Persist

Despite its political significance, the Charter faces substantial constitutional and legal hurdles to becoming a binding framework. Bangladesh's Constitution, though flexible in certain aspects, lacks provisions for directly incorporating revolutionary documents or charters into statutory law without parliamentary or judicial action (Choudhury, 1972; Faruqui, 2010). Moreover, the judiciary's historical reluctance to validate extra-constitutional initiatives further constrains the Charter's legal pathway (Kabir, 2020).

The absence of a formal mechanism to translate popular movements into constitutional amendments exposes a structural gap in Bangladesh's legal system — a gap between de facto political legitimacy and de jure constitutional recognition (Ackerman, 1991; Elster, 1995). This has left the Charter's supporters, including Jamaat-e-Islami and allied parties, reliant on political

negotiation and legislative advocacy rather than legal enforcement (Rahman & Nasrin, 2022).

Popular Sovereignty vs. Constitutional Formalism

The findings also highlight a fundamental tension between popular sovereignty and constitutional formalism. On one hand, the Charter enjoys broad social legitimacy, reflecting Rousseau's idea that sovereignty belongs to the people (Rousseau, 1762). On the other hand, the state's constitutional framework prioritizes procedural legality and institutional continuity over revolutionary change (Habermas, 1996).

This tension mirrors broader global experiences, such as Chile's 1988 plebiscite and South Africa's 1994 negotiated transition, where revolutionary demands had to be reconciled with existing legal frameworks to achieve enduring legitimacy (Siavelis, 2009; Spitz & Chaskalson, 2000). In Bangladesh, however, this reconciliation remains incomplete, creating a risk of political deadlock or social unrest if legal pathways for recognition are not pursued.

Jamaat-e-Islami and Allied Parties as Key Catalysts

The research finds that Jamaat-e-Islami and six other opposition parties have played a central role in transforming the Charter from a revolutionary document into a political agenda. Their campaigns, parliamentary initiatives, and public protests have kept the issue of legal recognition on the national agenda (Kabir, 2020; Hasan, 2023).

These parties argue that without constitutional or statutory recognition, the 2026 national election risks lacking legitimacy and public trust (Rahman & Nasrin, 2022). Their strategic framing of the Charter as a prerequisite for *free and fair elections* has resonated with civil society groups and segments of the electorate, further intensifying pressure on the government.

Risks of Non-Recognition for Democratic Stability

Failure to legally recognize or address the Charter's demands poses significant risks for Bangladesh's democratic consolidation and political stability. Comparative historical experiences show that revolutionary moments left unresolved often lead to institutional crises, legitimacy deficits, and cycles of unrest (Huntington, 1991; Skocpol, 1979). If the government proceeds with the 2026 elections without addressing Charter-related demands, it may face widespread boycotts, political violence, or erosion of institutional trust (Riaz & Fair, 2011).

Additionally, non-recognition could weaken Bangladesh's international democratic credibility, affecting its relations with global partners and organizations advocating for democratic governance (UNDP, 2024; Transparency International Bangladesh, 2024).

Comparative Lessons Indicate Possible Pathways

Finally, the research identifies valuable comparative lessons from other contexts where revolutionary charters were successfully integrated into legal systems. South Africa's post-apartheid constitution (1996) institutionalized key elements of the anti-apartheid struggle (Spitz & Chaskalson, 2000). Similarly, Chile's 1988 plebiscite paved the way for constitutional reforms aligned with popular demands (Siavelis, 2009). These cases illustrate that legal recognition is achievable through negotiated settlements, constitutional conventions, or referenda, rather than unilateral state action. For Bangladesh, a similar approach — potentially involving a national dialogue, constitutional review commission, or plebiscite — could offer a peaceful and lawful route to transform the July 2024 Charter into a legitimate legal framework.

In sum, the research finds that the July 2024 Revolution represents a genuine expression of popular sovereignty and democratic aspiration, but its institutionalization is obstructed by constitutional rigidity, political resistance, and procedural formalism. While Jamaat-e-Islami and allied parties have been instrumental in sustaining the demand for legal recognition, the absence of a structured pathway threatens to destabilize the political landscape. Comparative experiences suggest that a negotiated, participatory approach — grounded in constitutionalism yet responsive to revolutionary ideals — offers the most viable solution for integrating the Charter into Bangladesh's legal order.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The struggle for legal recognition of the July 2024 Certificate represents a critical intersection of revolutionary legitimacy, constitutional law, and electoral politics in Bangladesh. The declaration is more than a symbolic artifact; it embodies collective aspirations for justice, equality, and democratic reform. Legal recognition could enhance electoral legitimacy, institutionalize reform, and strengthen the relationship between citizens and the state (Rahman, 2025; Ahmed, 2024).

However, integrating a revolutionary document into the legal framework requires careful consideration of constitutional norms, procedural legitimacy, and political stability (Schedler, 2015). Rapid or unilateral action risks undermining both the revolution's credibility and the broader democratic order. Recommendations for policymakers include:

1. **Constitutional Review and Amendment:** Engage legal experts to evaluate compatibility with the 1972 Constitution and draft precise amendments to accommodate the revolutionary demands (Hossain, 2023).
2. **Inclusive Political Consultation:** Ensure that all political parties, civil society actors, and youth representatives participate in decision-making to

foster legitimacy and consensus (Levitsky & Way, 2010).

3. **Electoral System Adjustment:** Explore proportional representation or reserved quotas to reflect the inclusivity principles outlined in the July Declaration (Ahmed, 2024).
4. **Symbolic Recognition:** Incorporate the declaration into public education, commemorations, and national discourse to reinforce its legitimacy alongside formal legal recognition (Tilly, 2004).
5. **Judicial Safeguards:** Establish judicial oversight to ensure amendments and electoral reforms adhere to constitutional principles and prevent misuse for political gain (Posner & Young, 2007).

Ultimately, the July 2024 Certificate presents both an opportunity and a challenge. Its legal incorporation could serve as a model for bridging revolutionary ideals with institutional governance. Drawing on comparative experiences, Bangladesh can navigate this transition, ensuring that revolutionary aspirations strengthen rather than destabilize democratic institutions. The path forward requires balancing symbolic legitimacy, constitutional integrity, and participatory politics.

CONCLUSION

The July Revolution 2024 stands as a watershed in Bangladesh's contemporary political history, embodying the people's collective will to transform a deeply entrenched political order and demand accountability, inclusivity, and genuine democratic governance. At the heart of this transformative moment lies the *July Revolution Charter 2025* — a document that, while revolutionary in origin, aspires to evolve into a constitutional instrument capable of reshaping the country's legal and political landscape. Yet, as this research demonstrates, the path from revolutionary legitimacy to legal mandate remains fraught with challenges, contradictions, and contested narratives (Habermas, 1996; Ackerman, 1991).

The study reveals that the Charter is not merely a symbolic artifact of protest but a substantive articulation of the principles of popular sovereignty, participatory democracy, and institutional reform (Rousseau, 1762; Dahl, 1989). It encapsulates widespread public aspirations to move beyond procedural democracy and establish a political order grounded in transparency, justice, and equality. However, its lack of legal recognition exposes the structural rigidity of Bangladesh's constitutional framework, which prioritizes procedural continuity and state-centric legitimacy over revolutionary impulses (Elster, 1995; Faruqui, 2010).

Moreover, the persistent efforts by Jamaat-e-Islami and allied political forces to secure the Charter's formal recognition underscore the evolving nature of democratic contestation in Bangladesh. Their campaigns

illustrate that revolutions alone do not institutionalize change; rather, sustained political negotiation, legislative advocacy, and public mobilization are essential for transforming revolutionary ideals into binding constitutional norms (Rahman & Nasrin, 2022; Riaz, 2016). This aligns with historical experiences elsewhere — such as South Africa’s negotiated transition in 1994 or Chile’s post-1988 constitutional reforms — where revolutionary demands were incorporated into legal structures through inclusive, deliberative processes (Siavelis, 2009; Spitz & Chaskalson, 2000).

The research also highlights the risks of ignoring the Charter’s demands. Failure to engage with this movement may deepen political polarization, undermine public trust in democratic institutions, and threaten the legitimacy of the 2026 national election (Huntington, 1991; Riaz & Fair, 2011). Conversely, embracing a process that integrates revolutionary aspirations with constitutional mechanisms — potentially through a national dialogue, referendum, or constitutional amendment — offers a pathway to reconcile popular sovereignty with constitutional order.

In conclusion, the struggle for the legal recognition of the July 2024 Charter is more than a political battle; it is a defining test of Bangladesh’s democratic maturity. By bridging the gap between revolutionary legitimacy and legal formalism, Bangladesh has the opportunity to not only honor the spirit of the July Revolution but also to lay the foundations for a more inclusive, accountable, and enduring democratic future.

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